

Talking Points re Crossfire Hurricane Cases
March 8, 2017

Introduction:

- (U//FOUO) There has been an extraordinary amount of speculation regarding the FBI's investigative efforts into potential ties between Russia and members of the Trump campaign. I'm here today to describe what the FBI is and is not doing with regard to these matters.
- [REDACTED] Hostile foreign governments deploy a wide range of foreign influence techniques. Foreign influence—also known as political influence—is defined as foreign-directed perception management or active measures operations intended to influence U.S. priority policies or policymakers in order to adversely affect national security. The FBI has always worked to disrupt foreign influence activities; this effort existed in the lead-up to the 2016 Presidential election and continues today. Of course the FBI's work in this regard is not just focused on Russia.
- [REDACTED] Of primary concern to us are intelligence officers: those people trained to identify, recruit, and direct people to do things like gain access to classified information and otherwise clandestinely act as their agents. In the years preceding the election, the FBI is aware of contact between Russian intelligence officers and Carter Page; however, we did not see contact between Russian intelligence officers and members of the Trump campaign or administration, either in the months preceding the election or afterwards.
- [REDACTED] A second category includes overt diplomats and government officials, people who, while not trained intelligence officers, still interact with U.S. government officials in many different contexts in order to pursue their nation's policy objectives. This category includes people like Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] A final group are personnel who function as co-optees, access agents, or agents of influence, who are not employed by a foreign government but nonetheless are used to advance governmental aims. For example, the FBI commonly encounters individuals who are Russian oligarchs or businessmen who may be motivated by a confluence of personal, business, and patriotic reasons. The FBI's challenge and objective is to discern whether a particular action is motivated by the individual's own interest, the foreign nation they are associated with, or some combination of both. As part of this current effort, the FBI is looking at these types of Russian actors and their efforts targeting

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individuals affiliated with the Trump campaign and administration, which I will describe next.

Predication:

- [REDACTED] On July 27, 2016, a friendly foreign government contacted the FBI to advise that in May 2016, George Papadopoulos, an individual identified at that time by then-Presidential Candidate Trump as an official foreign policy advisor for the Trump campaign, told him/her that Papadopoulos was aware that, as described by the foreign government, "the Trump team had received some kind of suggestion from Russia that it [Russia] could assist [the campaign] with the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to Mrs. Clinton (and President Obama)." This statement predicated the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE umbrella investigation.
 - [REDACTED] Papadopoulos did not identify the campaign individual who purportedly received the suggestion from Russia, nor did he identify how or whether the Trump team reacted to the offer. In an effort to identify the potential recipient of the "suggestion," the FBI identified four individuals who it deemed more likely to have engaged in such contact with the Russians.
- [REDACTED] The below summaries provide a snapshot as of this moment of the current status of the still ongoing investigations.

Crossfire Hurricane Cases:

- [REDACTED] **George Papadopoulos** [REDACTED] - In mid-March 2016, George Papadopoulos was identified by then-Presidential Candidate Trump as an official foreign policy advisor for the Trump campaign.
 - [REDACTED] The FBI interviewed Papadopoulos on multiple occasions in late January and early February, 2017. Papadopoulos admitted to receiving information in early 2016 from a UK-based think tank director with professed connections to the Government of Russia. According to Papadopoulos, the think tank director stated Russia possessed "dirt on [Clinton]" in the form of "thousands" of emails. Papadopoulos also admitted to contact with the same friendly foreign government that provided the FBI with the predicated information. However, Papadopoulos has not confirmed the information reported by the friendly foreign government source regarding Papadopoulos's knowledge of contact between the Trump team and the Russians.
 - [REDACTED] Since his last interview in mid-February, Papadopoulos has refused to meet with the FBI.
- [REDACTED] **Carter Page** [REDACTED] - In mid-March 2016, Carter Page was identified by then-Presidential Candidate Trump as an official foreign policy advisor for the Trump campaign. Page also has a long history of ties to the Russian Federation, including business relationships, financial investments, travel, and direct contact with Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) intelligence officers, and had been an FBI CI subject prior to the Crossfire Hurricane investigation.
 - [REDACTED] In reports prepared by CROWN, a former FBI CHS, Page was reported to have had "secret meetings" in early July 2016 with a named individual in Russia's

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Presidential Administration during which they discussed Russia's release of damaging information on Hillary Clinton in exchange for alterations to the GOP platform regarding U.S. policy towards Ukraine. (This statement has not yet been corroborated). The reports prepared by CROWN further indicated that Paul Manafort was reported to have initially "managed" the relationship between Russian government officials and the Trump campaign, using Carter Page as an intermediary. In the wake of increased media scrutiny over his dealings with Russia, Page's role in the campaign was publicly disavowed in late September 2016, and after that time there appears to be minimal contact between Page and members of the Trump campaign and administration.

- [REDACTED] coverage of Page was authorized on October 21, 2016, and renewed in mid-January 2017. No drafts of the [REDACTED] applications were "denied" by the Court.
- [REDACTED] **Paul J. Manafort, Jr.** [REDACTED] - Paul Manafort was the campaign chairman and chief strategist for then-Presidential candidate Donald Trump between May and August 2016. Manafort has long standing ties to current and former members of the pro-Russian political faction in Ukraine, including ties with former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich, and he has conducted business deals with Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs.
 - [REDACTED] In reports prepared by CROWN, a former FBI CHS, Manafort was reported to have initially "managed" the relationship between Russian government officials and the Trump campaign, using Carter Page as an intermediary. (This statement has not yet been corroborated). In the wake of increased media scrutiny over his dealings with Russia and Ukraine in mid-August 2016, Manafort was initially demoted within the Trump campaign and subsequently resigned.
- [REDACTED] **Michael Flynn** [REDACTED] - Retired Lieutenant General and former DIA Director Michael T. Flynn was a foreign policy advisor to then-Presidential Candidate Trump since late 2015. Flynn has a history of ties to the Russian Federation, including professional relationships, travel, and direct contact with staff at the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C.
 - [REDACTED] Flynn engaged in a series of telephone calls with Russian Ambassador Kislyak in late December 2016, including discussions about a UN vote on Israeli settlements and discussions regarding the U.S. expulsion of Russian diplomats and facility closures.
 - These calls were collected via traditional FBI [REDACTED] coverage of the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C.
 - This collection did not involve Section 702.
 - The FBI routinely monitors foreign establishments to understand their clandestine intelligence activities here in the U.S. Importantly, while this activity targets the foreign power, in pursuit of its counterintelligence mission, the FBI monitors this collection in an effort to discover U.S.

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persons who may be targeted by the foreign power, or engaged in clandestine intelligence gathering on behalf of a foreign power.

- o (U//FOUO) Flynn was interviewed by the FBI on January 24, 2017.

Potential Questions and Answers re Crossfire Hurricane Cases
March 8, 2017

[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) If asked about POTUS Tweets:

- [REDACTED] To date, the FBI has not conducted electronic surveillance targeting Candidate Trump or President Trump, his "server," or any member of his administration, now, or during the campaign. Media reports indicating otherwise are inaccurate.
- [REDACTED] Additionally, no draft [REDACTED] applications regarding these areas were presented to the [REDACTED] Court and withdrawn. That reporting is also inaccurate.
 - [REDACTED] **Alfa Bank:** In fall 2016, the FBI received an allegation that Alfa Bank, a Russian bank with close ties to the Kremlin, was covertly communicating with the Trump campaign. In assessing this allegation, the FBI determined that a U.S.-based server, which housed an email domain previously used to send advertising emails on behalf of President Trump's hotel business, was trying to communicate with the bank's server.
 - [REDACTED] A U.S.-based company administered the email domain and the related hotel business marketing campaign, and a separate U.S.-based company ran a U.S.-based server that housed it. The administering company indicated the email domain had been discontinued by Trump's hotel business. Ultimately, the FBI (and two private computer security companies) found no evidence of emails being sent between the bank and the candidate's discontinued business domain.
 - [REDACTED] And contrary to press reports, no [REDACTED] surveillance was used to investigate the Alfa Bank allegation regarding the server, and no draft applications were presented to the FISC.

[REDACTED] If asked about CROWN/Steele:

- [REDACTED] CROWN, a former FBI CHS, is a former friendly foreign intelligence service employee who has reported for about three years, and some of whose reporting has been corroborated. CROWN has been previously compensated by the FBI, however, the

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information regarding Russian activities directed at the Trump campaign was collected by CROWN on behalf of private clients.

- [REDACTED] CROWN maintains a network of sub-sources, who, in many cases, utilize their own sub-sources. CROWN's reporting in this matter is derived primarily from a Russian-based source, who uses a network of sub-sources. The FBI has no control over the Russian-based sub-source or any of the sub-sources used by the Russian-based sub-source.
- [REDACTED] The FBI did not pay CROWN for the information on Russia's activities relating to Trump and the Trump campaign. The FBI only paid for CROWN's travel arrangements to meet with us.
 - Independent of his pre-existing source relationship to the FBI, CROWN was retained by an individual who been hired, first by a Republican primary challenger to Trump (identity unknown to the FBI), and later by an entity related to the Democratic Party (identity also unknown to the FBI).
 - Following his collection and production of information to his client(s), CROWN approached and voluntarily provided the FBI with the information he had collected, based on his stated patriotic concern about the nature of the information.
 - [REDACTED] After receiving the information, the FBI met with CROWN and told him that while the allegations in the reports were significant, the FBI needed evidence to support the allegations made in the reporting. The FBI stated that depending on the nature of such evidence, the FBI might be willing to pay for such material.

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**Redlines re Crossfire Hurricane Cases
March 7, 2017**

- Discussion of the identity of the foreign nation providing the predicated information.
- [REDACTED]
- Discussion related to the FBI's input into the AG's recusal decision, on deliberative process grounds.
- Discussion of whether any US Attorney's office has been assigned to any case, as well as detail regarding future investigative strategy or prosecutive discussion.

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