

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Assessment of the provided white paper and supporting documentation on (2) thumb drives.

SUMMARY – ECOU 1 assess there is no CyD equity in this report and that the research conducted in the report reveals some questionable investigative steps taken and conclusions drawn. This opinion is drawn from the following observations:

The investigators who conducted the research appear to have done the following:

1. Searched, via publically available information, for every internet domain (a “domain” is “abc.com”) that had the word “Trump” in it.
2. Scrubbed that list of those domains for the words “mail”, “smtp”, “relay”, or “mta”. Filtering on these key words would provide possibilities of mail servers.
 - a. For any given domain name (“abc.com”), there could be an e-mail server that provides e-mail services to the domain. This service allows the owner of “abc.com” to have e-mail addresses such as “johndoe@abc.com”, etc). E-mail servers have a domain name of their own, and commonly, those domain names could be something like “mail.abc.com”, or “mail1.abc.com”, etc.
 - b. These steps are a very round-about way to identify mail servers associated with domains. A more standard process would be to look up a domain such as “trump-email.com”, and then search for attending mail servers to trump-email.com. However, this standard process would not reveal mail1.trump-email.com (because mail1.trump-email.com isn’t registered as the mail server for trump-email.com). Furthermore, if one were to only be looking for hidden mail servers, it is unlikely one would search for Donald Trump’s hidden mail servers by searching for mail servers with the name “trump” and “mail” included in them. Therefore, these two search steps could indicate the investigator already knew of the domain “mail1.trump-email.com”, and conducted these searches to reverse-support their knowledge.
3. Results from steps 1 and 2 are stated in the research paper to yield 537 domains. These results were filtered by domains that were “...registered by the Trump organization...”, which yielded 15 results.
 - a. Registration by the Trump organization appears to have been confirmed via whois lookups. This is a reliable source, but should not be deemed definitive without confirmation through formal legal process.
 - b. One of these 15 results was the domain “mail1.trump-email.com”.
4. The next steps the investigator took were:
 - a. Attempted to communicate with mail1.trump-email.com over port 25 (a mail submission port), and received an error message indicating the server did not accept communications over port 25 from the investigator’s IP address (not definitive whether the server would receive communication from others, or even many others).
 - b. Searched “...global nonpublic DNS activity...” (unclear how this was done) and discovered there are (4) primary IP addresses that have resolved the name

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT

0247

21-CR-582 CRC

FBI-DWS-01-0000187

SCO-011047
SCO-3500U-016866

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

"mail1.trump-email.com". Two of these belong to DNS servers at Russian Alfa Bank. [When computer A wants to communicate with computer B, computer A must know computer B's IP address. In order to learn computer B's IP address, computer A conducts a DNS lookup, which essentially is a public inquiry, asking "Hello world, what is the IP address for mail1.trump-email.com?" The investigator's research indicates, over the period May 4 2016 – Sept 4 2016, two of Alfa Bank's DNS resolvers, asked the world 614 times what mail1.trump-email.com's IP address was, presumably so it (a computer at Alfa Bank) could communicate with mail1.trump-email.com. Two other IPs also conducted a statistically significant number of DNS lookups for email1.trump-email.com.

- c. Provided the identities of numerous dubious persons associated with Alfa Bank.
- 5. From the steps in # 4 above, the investigator seems to have concluded the following, which may or may not be true:
 - a. That mail1.trump-email.com is in fact a mail server and is owned by a Trump organization; this conclusion seems based off of:
 - i. The whois record
 - ii. The name "mail1" included in the domain name (though you can name a domain anything you want; the domain name "i.am.an.email.server.trump.com" is not necessarily an e-mail server for trump.com)
 - iii. That mail1.trump-email.com is responsive (though with an error message) to standard e-mail receiving port 25
 - b. That mail1.trump-email.com is "secret", or obfuscated from the general public, because:
 - i. The Russian computers must be configured specially to talk directly to mail1.trump-email.com (because you cannot find mail1.trump-email.com via a standard MX (mail server) lookup of trump-email.com).
 - c. That the [presumed] e-mail server is set up specifically to only communicate to designated IP addresses (though there is no substantiation that mail1.trump-email.com communicates with any IPs at all).
 - d. That the Russian computers have actually communicated with mail1.trump-email.com (though there is only information indicating the Russian computers have asked what mail1.trump-email.com's IP address is).
 - e. That there is no plausible reason why these communications would occur excepting for illegitimate reasons. This is because a server (such as mail1.trump-email.com) would never be found by somebody trying to send mail directly to the trump-email.com domain. A person would have to expressly search for the obscure name "mail1.trump-email.com" to find it. Therefore the Russian computers have been specially configured to communicate directly to "mail1.trump-email.com".
 - f. The communication between mail1.trump-email.com is between the Trump organization and bad actors working at Alfa Bank or associated with Alfa Bank.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

In conclusion, ECOU 1 suggests there is currently no cyber intrusion component in this case and that the report provided contains questionable methods and intentions. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Furthermore, it appears suspicious that the presumed suspicious activity began approximately three weeks prior to the stated start of the investigation conducted by the researcher.

Finally, it appears abnormal that a presidential candidate, who wanted to conduct secret correspondence with the Russian government (or a Russian bank), would (1) name his secret server "mail1.trump-email.com", (2) use a domain (trump-email.com) registered to his own organization, and then (3) communicate directly to the Russian bank's IP address (as opposed to using TOR or proxy servers). ECOU 1 also assesses Russian state-sponsored technical sophistication to exceed the OpsSec of that suggested in the report.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

FBI-DWS-01-0000189

SCO-011049
SCO-3500U-016868