**From:** Ryan McCombs <ryan.mccombs@crowdstrike.com>
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 16, 2016 12:56 PM
**To:** Adrian.Hawkins@ic.fbi.gov
**Subject:** [Suspect] RE: PurpleDay Compromised System Locations
**Attach:** smime.p7s; ATT00001.txt; ATT00002.htm

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Excellent.

As discussed yesterday, document authentication will be a challenge, especially from CrowdStrike's perspective. I think the path of least resistance is, if provided the hashes, we check our collected data first. In the likely event we don't have the hashes in our data, the next step would be to approach MIS to query the DNC systems. I'm not sure what kind of push back would be received, but that's why Mr. Sussmann is here. This second option would be resource intensive, as they have many TB of data that would need to be hashed. Secondly, there's no guarantee that the original document hasn't been changed since released by G2, thereby changing the hash value. A tough nut to crack for sure.

We'd love to receive the docs. Please send to:

CrowdStrike Services, LLC
ATTN: Ryan McCombs
1807 Park 270 Drive
St Louis, MO 63146

Regards,

Ryan McCombs
Consultant, Crowdstrike Services
ryan.mccombs@crowdstrike.com
REDACTED.5254

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**From:** Hawkins, E. A. (WF) (FBI) [mailto:Adrian.Hawkins@ic.fbi.gov]
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 16, 2016 11:37 AM
**To:** Ryan McCombs <ryan.mccombs@crowdstrike.com>
**Subject:** Re: PurpleDay Compromised System Locations

??Got it this time, thanks!

Only other thing outstanding for us right now, then, is for us to authenticate some docs. Understand hash match is machine intensive, computer scientist here was thinking maybe we scan for file name (much faster?), and do a hash comparison for just positive matches. Also, the looping structure can break if we find, say, 3 matches? Also don't know who will take that on as action item. I'm strung between three folks (MIS, Sussman, and yourselves) so apologize if I'm asking wrong person.?

Will be sending a CDROM with a copy of the docs to Sussmann via FedEx today. Happy to share with you as well, if needed.

v/r,
Adrian

?
E. Adrian Hawkins
Special Agent
Washington Field Office
REDACTED-6674

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**From:** Ryan McCombs <ryan.mccombs@crowdstrike.com>
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 16, 2016 11:11 AM
**To:** Hawkins, E. A. (WF) (FBI)
**Subject:** [Suspect] FW: PurpleDay Compromised System Locations

Attempt #2

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**From:** Ryan McCombs
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 16, 2016 9:53 AM
**To:** 'Adrian.Hawkins@ic.fbi.gov' <Adrian.Hawkins@ic.fbi.gov>
**Cc:** Shawn Henry <shawn@crowdstrike.com>; Christopher Scott <chris@crowdstrike.com>; 'MSussmann@perkinscoie.com' <MSussmann@perkinscoie.com>
**Subject:** FW: PurpleDay Compromised System Locations

Agent Hawkins,

Please see the responses below from the IT staff at DCCC in regards to locations of systems during compromise. It's not very telling for the workstations, however it does answer for the servers. When they reference the server room, they're referring to the server room within the DNC headquarters. Let me know if there is anything else you need from our end.

Regards,

Ryan McCombs
Consultant, Crowdstrike Services
ryan.mccombs@crowdstrike.com
REDACTED.5254

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**From:** Ryan Borkenhagen [mailto:Borkenhagen@DCCC.ORG]
**Sent:** Monday, August 15, 2016 4:40 PM
**To:** Ryan McCombs <ryan.mccombs@crowdstrike.com>; David Winston <winston@dccc.org>
**Cc:** Christopher Scott <chris@crowdstrike.com>
**Subject:** RE: PurpleDay Compromised System Locations

All of our users (that have laptops) spend the majority of their time in our office. When on the road, they would be working out of local campaign offices, hotels, coffee shops… A lot of time they will be on a DCCC owned mifi device for internet but even then if there is a reliable wifi they can use (at hotel or campaign office) they will use that.

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**From:** Ryan McCombs [mailto:ryan.mccombs@crowdstrike.com]
**Sent:** Monday, August 15, 2016 5:28 PM

**To:** Ryan Borkenhagen <Borkenhagen@DCCC.ORG>; David Winston <winston@dccc.org>
**Cc:** Chris Scott <chris@crowdstrike.com>
**Subject:** RE: PurpleDay Compromised System Locations

Thanks, Ryan.

For the folks in the field, where do they typically operate?

Regards,

Ryan McCombs
Consultant, Crowdstrike Services
ryan.mccombs@crowdstrike.com
REDACTED5254

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**From:** Ryan Borkenhagen [mailto:Borkenhagen@DCCC.ORG]
**Sent:** Monday, August 15, 2016 4:27 PM
**To:** Ryan McCombs <ryan.mccombs@crowdstrike.com>; David Winston <winston@dccc.org>
**Cc:** Christopher Scott <chris@crowdstrike.com>
**Subject:** RE: PurpleDay Compromised System Locations

Here you go. All of the users are based out of our office but regularly take their laptops home or on the road with them.

Just a quick note the highlighted laptop is a new one (I didn't have it on my list before).

| Hostname | User (department) | Location |
|---|---|---|
| D3CBACKUP1 | Backup Server | Server Room |
| D3CFILE01 | File Server | Server Room |
| D3CMAIL04 | Old Mail server | Server Room |
| D3CSQL03 | SQL Server (hosts accounting DB) | Server Room |
| E54402XPTJ12 | Joclyn Mund (Field) | Laptop |
| E54407HDTVZ1 | Dan Sena Targeting and Field) | Laptop |
| LATE5440562PD12 | Milly Velez (Accounting) | Laptop |
| LATE54406B4PD12 | Dyland Gibson (Online) | Laptop |
| LATE63305J9PYW1 | Alex Farrington (Field) | Laptop |
| LATE6330CRBPYW1 | Sam Ward (Finance) | Laptop |
| LATE64201W444R1 | Leif Warner (Accounting) | Laptop |
| LATE642026MQCS1 | Ryan Thompson (Online) | Laptop |
| LATE64204PR7FV1 | Agnes O'Hanlon (Accounting) | Laptop |
| LATE64205H747R1 | Intern | Locked in office |
| LATE642086ZG5R1 | Yule Kim (Research) | Laptop |
| LATE64208PH44R1 | Intern | Locked in office |
| LATE72503SP8262 | Steve Sisneros (Field) | Laptop |
| LATE725048J8262 | Greg Diamond (Field) | Laptop |
| LATE72504CJ8262 | Mario Salazar (Field) | Laptop |
| LATE7250675FN32 | Amber Reeves (Targeting) | Laptop |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| LATE725078RFN32 | Barb Solish (Communications) | Laptop |
| LATE72509K4MN32 | Jackie Forte (Accounting) | Laptop |
| LATE7250DWZ9262 | Hayley Dierker (Operations) | Laptop |
| LATE7250HBXB262 | Missy Kurek (Finance) | Laptop |
| LATE7250JF3GN32 | Stella Ross (Finance) | Laptop |
| LATE72702JJFK72 | Julia Ager (Online) | Laptop |
| LATE727094WFK72 | John Malloy (Targeting) | Laptop |
| LATE72709FNFK72 | Amy Drummond (Targeting) | Laptop |
| OPT70409JB9482 | David Winston (IT) | IT Office |
| OPT70409JBB482 | Ryan Borkenhagen (IT) | IT Office |