PSS Interview

## P 1

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

**Electronic Communication**

**Title: XXXXXX** Interview of Igor Danchenko Date: 02/09/2017

From: xxxxxxxxx

-CD1

**Contact: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx**

Approved By: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Drafted By: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Case ID #: \*\*\*\*xxxxx xxxxxx Crossfire Hurricane;

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT –

RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

\*\*\*\*XXXX 1234567890 DRAGON 1234

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT –

RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

\*\*\*\*XXXX 1234567890 CROSSFIRE FURY

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT–RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

**Synopsis**: 12345678 Interview of Igor Danchenko. Danchenko was

interviewed for three days, this is a consolidated write-up of the

interview.

**Full Investigation Initiated:** 07/31/2016

Enclosure (s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. 1234567 Info from Danchenko;
2. (U) Proffer Agreement signed by Igor Danchenko

## Pdf 4

xxxxxxxx During the course of three days, Igor xxxxxxxxx Danchenko

was interviewed in the FBI’s Washington Field Office (WFO) by FBI

personnel along with attorneys from the US Department of Justice,


National Security Division. Danchenko was accompanied by his attorney

Mark E. Schamel of Womble. Below is a consolidated write-up of the

three days of interviews.

### 24 January 2017 (1330-1700)

**FBI Washington Field Office Interview Room**



**Present:**

Igor Danchenko, interviewee

Mark E. Schamel, interviewee’s attorney

Stephen M. Somma, FBI Special Agent NYFO

Brian Auten, FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst WFO

David Laufman, Chief, National Security Division, US Department of

Justice

# **I. Danchenko’s Background**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was born in the Russian city of Perm on 05/05/1978.

He describes his family as mixed nationality which included Russian

and Ukrainian. Danchenko completed his high school course in Perm in

1996. He indicated that his xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx is probably tied

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Proficiency in languages

## Pdf 5

to the fact that Perm was a 123456 city. During his high school years,

he traveled to the xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx for 1234567 and was also an

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. In 199x-9y, he attended a high

school in xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. In 199z, he also spent some weeks in

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, which at that time was “xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.”

(U//FOUO) For university, Danchenko attended Perm State University,

between 1996 and 2000, at which time he graduated with a degree in law.

Danchenko began work during and after college with a number of Russian

firms. He worked for PermTex (xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx),

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. While with PermTex, he made friends with a number

of individuals in the field of petroleum engineering. He was also

employed by a Siberian construction company, UralSubSoetStroy, during

which time he traveled to Iran. Also, during and immediately after his

time at Perm State University, he traveled to the United States with an

Open World Leadership Program and served as a facilitator. The Open

World Program is associated with the Library of Congress, and during

the 200x trip, he assisted and traveled with the delegation in DC and

other cities in the United States.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko’s desire had always been to obtain a graduate

degree in the United States. He applied to a number of schools, and

received the best – and one of the only – offers from the University of

Louisville. He said that his choice of Louisville didn’t involve

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, but it just happened that

the school gave him a full fellowship for his Master’s studies in

Political Science. He graduated from Louisville and wanted to stay and

work in the United States, with the hope of getting his Ph.D. He


eventually was accepted not to a PhD program, but to Georgetown’s


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
Perm State University


Open World Russian Leadership Program

Early in his career, Danchenko worked at [Lukoil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lukoil) subsidiary Permtex in Perm and at UralSubSoetStroy in [Iran](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran).[[*dead link*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Link_rot)] Between 1999 and 2005, he was a facilitator for the [Open World Russian Leadership Program](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_World_Program), US Library of Congress and a leader for senior Russian federal and regional delegations to the US









## pdf, 6

School of Foreign Service - CERES xxxxxxxxx program with a focus on

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and 1234567 (as he described it, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

1234567”). During and after his time at Georgetown University,

Danchenko worked at the Brookings Institute xxin varying ranks -

Analyst; and then Senior Analyst. He worked on research projects for

Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy. [*ANALYST NOTE: Later in the debriefing,*

*Danchenko’s attorney asked if we’d all heard about Danchenko’s work on*

*uncovering Vladimir Putin’s thesis plagiarism. We indicated that we*

*had, and that it was our understanding that he had done that work with*

Gaddy*. Danchenko confirmed that.*]

(U//FOUO) Danchenko explained that he soon hit a glass ceiling at

Brookings because of his nationality and his lack of a Ph.D. At that

time, he was also xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Xxxxxxxxx, who was xxxxxxxx and was noted as xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx on his M.A.

thesis. He left Brookings circa 2010, stayed xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx in

Washington D.C. and began to try his hand at independent consulting.

For a time, he did various analytical pieces on Russian risk analysis

with Eurasia Consulting LLC. In time, some of the work moved into the

area of due diligence and business intelligence. Danchenko says that he

saw opportunities to use his existing network of friends and colleagues

in the United States and Russia – e.g. high school (Perm); 12345678

12345, 1234566789, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. In 2011, he

began work for Sidar Global Ventures, again doing research and analysis

and due diligence work. At Sidar Global Ventures, he served as the

Russia and Eurasia Program Manager, which meant that he directed others

in doing business intelligence on various topics/sub-regions, including

Russia, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. He helped analysts under him figure

out how best to handle assignments and talk to clients. He also put

together weekly, bi-weekly and monthly reports. Danchenko worked for

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

1234567890123456789012


Eurasia Consulting LLC

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx


Russian risk analysis

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.





Jane’s






Nov 2009 Danchenko was back in the Perm region of Russia on November 7, 2009 and married 22yr old Elena Alekseevna on that date, and both were living in the US by some date in 2011. <https://twitter.com/Larry_Beech/status/1310061947950333952> What I can also tell you is that on March 31st, 2017 (following round 2 of PSS interviews) Danchenko filed for divorce. Both appeared pro se, no attorneys, no dispute, no custody issues, no child dispute, and it was granted upon initial hearing 5/15/17.






* [Yaroslav Zhalilo](https://www.governmentcontracts.us/government-contractors/webs-BSG1625224-2021312-eurasia-consulting-llc-Washington-DC.htm) [Nataliya Lakiza Sachuk](https://www.governmentcontracts.us/government-contractors/webs-BSG1625224-2021308-eurasia-consulting-llc-Washington-DC.htm)
* <https://web.archive.org/web/20110201180515/https://www.eurasiaconsulting.com/>

<https://web.archive.org/web/20110130231943/http://www.eurasiaconsulting.com/page.asp?page_id=370>


<https://web.archive.org/web/20110130232010/http://www.eurasiaconsulting.com/page.asp?page_id=400>



Zhalillo, Ukraine

Serge Bauer, Ukraine



<http://www.sidarglobal.com/> CEO Cenk Sidar,





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Sidar through the summer of 2014, at which time Sidar’s parent company

went bankrupt and Sidar Global closed.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko described his travel to Russia up through the 2013

period as sporadic and personal. He took a trip back to Russia during

200x in order to do research for his Georgetown MA thesis. The rest of

his trips to Russia during this time – which he said took place every

two years or so – were centered on 12345678901234567, 12345678901 and

celebrating New Year’s.

1234567890123

Georgetown MA

# II. Early Relationship with Steele and Orbis

**II. Danchenko’s Early Relationship and Eventual Employment with**

**Christopher Steele and Orbis Business Intelligence**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko first met Christopher Steele [hereafter Steele] in

the mid-to-late summer of 2010[[1]](#footnote-1). The introduction was brokered through

Fiona Hill, who, according to Danchenko, was acquainted with Steele’s

wife. In the period that Danchenko was looking for work, following the

end of his tenure at Georgetown. Brookings was involved with helping

Danchenko to try and find new employment opportunities. Gaddy found out

that Steele was setting up a new business, Orbis, and that he was on

the lookout for analytical help. Gaddy suggested that Danchenko might

consider looking at Orbis, and helped to broker an email introduction

to Steele. According to Danchenko, this was just one of the companies

Gaddy helped to broker introductions.[[2]](#footnote-2)

(U//FOUO) Danchenko met in person with Steele at a Starbucks in

\*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxx. They met for about an hour in the coffee shop, and then

went to Steele’s hotel, where they sat and talked for about 30 minutes.

Danchenko said that they really didn’t talk in-depth about Danchenko’s

background, but rather discussed Danchenko’s basic biographical

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### Steele and Independent Consultant, 2010-2011

information, his contacts/network, and his connections in \*\*\*\*. No work

was offered at this time, but Steele said that “If we [Orbis] get a

project, we’ll get in touch.”

U//FOUO) In circa \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Steele contacted Danchenko

and asked that he fulfill a project – an open source analysis of what

Danchenko thought were three of the best sectors of low-risk investment

xxxxx\*\*\*\*. Danchenko wrote a few pages, highlighting risks and

opportunities, and submitted them to Steele. Danchenko still wasn’t

sure at this time what Orbis’ primary focus was – he (Danchenko) said

that it was not clear if it was about due diligence and business

intelligence. For the short risk assessment report, Danchenko was paid

a few hundred dollars, direct-deposited into his account. He said he

was very appreciative of this, because he didn’t really have an income

at this time.

(U//FOUO) Later in 2011[[3]](#footnote-3), Steele told him that he had read and liked his

risk assessment and Danchenko was formally brought on board with Orbis.

He signed a confidentiality agreement, which he didn’t think twice

about signing because it was fairly standard – he compared it to the

types of paperwork he signed at Brookings, including sexual harassment

policy, etc. All contact with Steele was being done at this time via

email and Skype. Danchenko signed the confidentiality agreement,

scanned it, and sent it back to Steele via email. Danchenko did not

sign a “non-compete” agreement with Orbis, and he described his work

with Orbis initially as “\*\*\*x work” and “\*\*\*x projects” as he was still

with \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxx. Orbis was just part of his overall portfolio at this

time.

(U//FOUO) Initially, his work with Orbis was in the open source sphere.

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He did not have any visibility into Orbis’ end clients. Danchenko

commented that during his time with Orbis, he was always been trying

to understand the tangible results of his work – Danchenko’s attorney

added that his client, “never asked, and was never told [about final

clients].” The project requirements were always kept vague with few

concrete parameters – e.g. “Can you do some checking on this?” Also,

initially with Orbis, his sole contact was with Steele He was in email

and Skype communication with Steele and was informally introduced to

other Orbis employees during Skype calls, but Danchenko was never flown

out to the UK to meet with Steele and his Orbis team.

(U//FOUO) In \*\*\*\*, Danchenko had his first Orbis-financed trip to

123456. His specific project involved inquiries about a \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxx

Xxxxxxx [which Danchenko did not name] and the company’s owner, which

he described as a former Russian senator and Duma deputy. It was a due

diligence assignment, and he was meant to look for company/management

links to organized crime and Russia’s regional and federal power

structures. For this, he was wired $3,000. He used $1,500 to purchase a

round-trip ticket, and $1,500 to cover expenses for the trip. He used

his existing contacts and daisy-chained from them to try to identify

others with relevant information. For example, Danchenko explained, he

would use pre-existing contacts to find out if anyone he knew had

worked in public relations or advertising for a \*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxx\*.

Danchenko did not pay anyone for information, and reported back to

Steele verbally either via Skype or in-person in London.

(U//FOUO) In circa 201x-xy, Danchenko traveled for the first time in

his life to the United Kingdom. It was both a personal trip and a

business trip. Orbis paid for the trip, and during his time in the UK,

Danchenko met Steele – “for the second or third time in my life” - and

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also introduced to other Orbis employees, including James Wallis and

Kieran Porter, about whom Danchenko described as an analyst who had

graduated from an English university. Danchenko described the time with

Orbis as “general meetings, [pitching] potential projects, and

discussing general rumors about Putin and Putin’s new third term as

president. There was talk about what the “biggest rumors” or the

“biggest compromising info” regarding the Russian government was.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko could not remember exactly when he had first

learned that Steele was former MI-6. He thought it was around 2012 or

2013. He couldn’t remember if someone told him that fact, someone

mentioned it, or if it was just “common knowledge” that he had picked

up over time. [ANALYST NOTE: In discussing his knowledge of Steele’s

former intelligence service employment, Danchenko remarked that he

didn’t really care to know such things and wanted to “stay out of the

government’s business” – to which his attorney said, “Well, you haven’t

done a very good job of that.”]

(U//FOUO) Danchenko continued to work on a number of projects for Orbis

on all kinds of subjects, including Russian leadership, banking, and

the \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxx. He would provide reports every month or every

other month.

### Sidar Global

(U//FOUO) Through Danchenko, Sidar Global and Orbis were in a

contractual relationship, and it was Danchenko’s hope that 1234567

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx would result in 12345678901234’s and

Danchenko’s eventual ability to get a security clearance and set up his

own business. However, with the 2013 bankruptcy of Sidar Global’s

parent company – and the subsequent closing of Sidar Global itself –

Danchenko found himself in a difficult situation, 1234567890123456. He

Sarah Wolff

James Wallis – from Apelbaum on character count

Sam Stainer, Tyson Lee

Elliot Bull

Tatiana Duran


Samuel Stainer

Sam Steiner

<https://apelbaum.files.wordpress.com/2018/06/kieran-porter-orbis-and-walsingham-training4.jpg>

Sidar Global

123456789012



<https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mdd.232497/gov.uscourts.mdd.232497.10.0.pdf>

May 23 disorderly

Mr. Danchenko is employed by Sidar Global Advisors, as a Development Manager

he is legally present in the United States on a work visa, and currently residing in the District of Columbia with his wife and 2-year old daughter.


Mr. Danchenko had prearranged travel to Moscow, Russia, and Munich, Germany, between the dates of May 20, 2013, and June 9, 2013.

https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/13073488/united-states-v-danchenko/

1234567890123456

Target Labs Inc.

Larry Poltavtsev



<https://www.washingtonblade.com/2013/07/25/opinion-larry-poltavtsev-putin-empire-of-hatred-and-violence-russia-gay-lgbt/> l***ARRY POLTAVTSEV***

## p.11

### Target Labs 2014-03 to 2017-05

needed an entity to xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx – and as Orbis

couldn’t do it [as Danchenko’s attorney put it, because Orbis was a

British company] – Danchenko went to a friend, Larry Poltavtsev, who is

the Chief Executive Officer, Target Labs Inc. Poltavtsev was

receptive about bringing Danchenko on board with Target Lab but said

that they could only help him out if he had a source of income. At that

point, Danchenko introduced Steele and Poltavtsev and a formal

arrangement was set up between Orbis and Target Labs. Target Labs

served as the “contract vehicle” through which Danchenko would be paid

a monthly salary for his work for Orbis. Danchenko became a salaried

employee of Target Labs and xxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx his xxxxxxxxxxx

Danchenko. Out of the approximately xxx people employed at Target Labs,

Danchenko was the only one – as far as he knows – who was working

solely for Orbis, and Danchenko believes that only Poltavtsev knows of

his work for Orbis. Prior to this arrangement, the only paperwork tie

between Danchenko and Orbis was through the banking/wire transactions,

but after this, the only regular paperwork tie would be between

Danchenko and Target Labs. Danchenko said that he received after

deductions, etc. about $x000 in cash/month. *[ANALYST NOTE: Danchenko*

*also gave a figure of $y000/month, but is not clear how much Target*

*Labs charges Orbis for Danchenko’s services, which would indicate the*

*profit Target Labs makes from Danchenko’s Orbis-related work.]* Since

Danchenko is on a monthly salary with Target Labs, Steele can reach out

directly, give assignments and direct his (Danchenko’s) travel.

# III Policies and Procedures

**III. Danchenko Policies and Procedures While Traveling Abroad for**

**Orbis; Danchenko Contacts with Russian Intelligence and**

**Security Services**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked how he “covers” his queries with his

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sources. He typically tells his sources that he is working on a

research project or an analytical product. He was also asked if there

were friends, associates and/or sources who knew that he was collecting information for Orbis. He said “yes and no,” and explained that some of

his closer friends understand that he works in the area of due

diligence and business intelligence. Many of them think that he is

doing projects for entities like \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxx, the \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx or think tanks \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxx.

They don’t know that he works for Orbis, as he signed a non-disclosure

agreement and was told not to talk about the company. He has never

mentioned Chris Steele or Orbis to his friends and associates. He

emphasized that “you [the FBI] are the first people he’s told.”

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked if he takes notes on the information he

is collecting from his sources, or if he keeps any kind of records. He

was told by Steele that it is a security risk to take notes; he hasn’t

kept notes or electronic records. He occasionally makes scribbles

and/or chicken scratch notes here and there, but gives verbal debriefs

in \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxx following his trips to Russia. Altogether, with

respect to the election-related reporting, he had three trips \*\*\*\*xxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx\*\*\*\*. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. He also had one

additional United Kingdom trip. While \*\*\*\*xxxx, he was primarily \*x

xxx\*\*\*.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko had no communications with Steele while in Russia.

He was always advised by Steele that they were not to have

communications, or to minimize communications, saving them for only

emergency or urgent matters.

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(U//FOUO) During the conversation about Sergei Abyshev [see below],

Danchenko was asked if Orbis had ever asked him to broker direct

contact with one of his (Danchenko’s) sources, or whether Orbis was

comfortable keeping Danchenko as the intermediary between the sources

and the company. Danchenko indicated that Orbis has always kept him

(Danchenko) as the intermediary.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko indicated that, to his knowledge, he has not had

any contacts with the Russian intelligence or security services. [ANALY

ST NOTE: His attorney emphasized “to his knowledge” during this part of

the discussion.] Danchenko said that he had contacts with Russian

government officials \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, as he said, in the

xxxxxxxxxxxxx\*\*\*\* - but he denied any contact – again, “as far as he

(Danchenko) knew,” with anyone in the SVR, GRU or FSB.

# IV. Initial Election-Related Assignments for Orbis

(U//FOUO) Around March 2016, Danchenko and Chris Steele had a voice

conversation during which time Steele asked Danchenko to see what he

(Danchenko) could find out about Paul Manafort, including his

reputation in the United States, his connections to the Yanukovich regime

in Ukraine, and any corruption ties. He related some of Steele’s

corruption-related questions – “Do you know [about] Manafort? Find out

about Manafort’s dealings with Ukraine, his dealings with other

countries, and any corrupt schemes [to which Manafort is connected].”

Danchenko said that he was “clueless” about who Manafort was, and that

this was a “strange task” to have been given. It was strange because

Danchenko had not done US-related projects for Orbis before, and he was

a bit uncomfortable working on a topic dealing with U.S. elections.

Steele did not give him a tight deadline on this assignment. At this

12345678901234

U.S. elections

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point, Danchenko was on salary with Orbis through Target Labs, and

there was no difference in financial remuneration for this assignment.

He had no inclinations as to why, or for whom, Steele was asking about

Manafort. Danchenko carefully asked around some of his American

friends. He said he may have asked friends and contacts in Russia, but

he couldn’t remember off-hand. He added that, for this topic, his

friends and contacts in Russia couldn’t say very much because they were

“too far removed” from the matter. Danchenko recalled that he was able

to find articles about Manafort’s ties to Ukraine and the Philippines.

Danchenko reported some of the findings on this assignment to Steele

using Signal, a secure messenger app, which he has used, in addition to

Skype, for communicating with Steele.

(U//FOUO) In the last week of **\*\*\*\*5678901234567890123**, Danchenko took

an Orbis-related trip **to Russia**. He was working primarily on a business

intelligence matter – a**\*\*\*\*** Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzxxxxxxxxxxxx. 12345678

zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz. For this trip, Chris also asked

Danchenko to look for information dealing with the US presidential

election, including compromising materials on Donald Trump. Danchenko

said he could not remember if Steele had asked Danchenko to ask around

for compromising materials on just Trump, or Trump and Hillary Clinton

– at which point Danchenko’s attorney indicated that Danchenko had told

him [the attorney] previously that it had been both presidential

candidates. The request did not shock Danchenko, but it was – again –

outside the normal scope of work and it wasn’t completely comfortable

for him. Like the Manafort assignment, it was not really a

Russia-specific job and it involved, indirectly, his “xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxx.” He was nervous and cautious when asking around about

the topic in Russia, but he felt like he had to report something back

to Steele about it. Steele did not place any higher priority on the

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election-related requirements; it was still a side effort to the

**\*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx**. It was, to Danchenko, “unpleasant,” but he

made inquiries and had a few election-related conversations, but it

wasn’t the main focus of his trip.

# V. Danchenko’s Contacts on his June Trip to Russia

### Source 2 - Ivan Mikhailovich Vorontsov

(U//FOUO) Ivan Mikhailovich Vorontsov

(U//FOUO) Ivan Mikhailovich Vorontsov is in his mid-forties, probably

around forty-five. Danchenko has known Vorontsov for about ten

years. They first met at a xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. They were together at the xxxxxx and struck

it off well. He is now a good friend. Vorontsov comes from a xxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and, more distantly, xxxxxxxx.

Vorontsov himself is a xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, and a

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. He runs his own Facebook page, and has

served as xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx of two different xxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. He is

xxxxxxx. He has been Danchenko’s source of information regarding

economic sanctions, and actions taken by xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx – a friend of 1234’s - knows a 123

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx handling the company’s public and governmental

relations (PR/GR). Another of Vorontsov’s close friends works as a

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxx. Vorontsov is an avid collector of foreign currencies. He

often tries to monetize his relationship with Danchenko, suggesting

that the two of them should try and do projects together for money.

Vorontov told Danchenko that there was compromising material on Trump.

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx\*\*\*\*

Collector of foreign currencies

### Source 3

(U//FOUO) Olga xxxxxxxxxxx Galkina

## 16

(U//FOUO) Olga Galkina was born in 1234567890123456. She is a close

personal friend to Danchenko. She is originally from Perm, and then

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. They have been friends since [the equivalent

of] the 8th grade xxxxxxx – xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. Upon reflection,

Danchenko corrected himself, indicating that she had been a year behind

him in the Perm State University Medical School. She moved to Moscow in

20xx, where she worked in the 1234567890 field. She did a bit of

Xxxxxxxxxxxxx, worked in xxxxxxxxx, and also xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. She went to the xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx *[ANALYST NOTE:*

*what is now called xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, w*here she took

**1234567 as her first language, 1234567 as her second language, and also**

studied Bulgarian. Danchenko added that Galkina’s family has a vacation

home in Bulgaria. Galkina worked for 123456789x, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. In the

xxxxxxxxx, Galkina moved to 123456, where she served as 1234567

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. For about a year now, Galkina has lived in

Limassol, Cyprus. Danchenko said that he was not exactly sure what

she does now in Cyprus, but she has done \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxx and

works \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxx, a Russian \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.

(U//FOUO) Galkina and Danchenko have remained friends for many years.

her father helped him financially years ago – he would borrow money

from her father, and her father wouldn’t ask for repayment. More

recently, he has helped out Galkina financially – probably around

$x0,000 over the past ten years.

(U//FOUO) Galkina has a vast network of people who are employed in the

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx\*\*\*\*. Through

Galkina’s \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Danchenko has been able to collect

## 17

information for Orbis across a wide range of topics – major Russian

firms; Russian state entities, including the Kremlin. GALKINA’s “big

connection” – though Danchenko emphasized that it is not necessarily her direct contact – is \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. GALKINA may have met him in

person, but she knows a couple of \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxx who have good access to

123456 and upon whom 123456 has relied to get out his own messaging.

Danchenko wasn’t sure, but he thought these contacts may include

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx\*\*\*\* who Danchenko met while he was at

\*\*\*\*xxxxx and who used to head \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxx.

(U//FOUO) Through GALKINA, Danchenko has also become good friends with

the \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, who was assaulted in Russia

for \*\*\*\*xxxxxxx.

(U//FOUO) Galkina is one of the individuals who knows that Danchenko

works for due diligence and business intelligence. [As an aside at this

point, Danchenko insisted that Ivan xVorontsov probably has a better

idea about this than does Galkina because Ivan is always trying to

monetize his relationship with Danchenko. Danchenko reiterated again to

the interviewers that Ivan will often pitch money-making ideas or

projects – “Let’s work together. I (Ivan) can try and get 12345678 to

(U//FOUO) Galkina is one of the individuals who knows that Danchenko

works for due diligence and business intelligence. [As an aside at this

point, Danchenko insisted that 1234567890 1234 probably has a better

idea about this than does Galkina because 1234 is always trying to

monetize his relationship with Danchenko. Danchenko reiterated again to

the interviewers that 1234 will often pitch money-making ideas or

projects – “Let’s work together. I (1234) can try and get 12345678 to

answer a question, but I’ll *need some money to do it*.”] GALKINA has an understanding that Danchenko is “connected.” In fact, either yesterday

morning or this morning, Galkina reached out to Danchenko and asked him

for help in translating article on how Russian citizens living in the

United States are viewing the Trump administration. She is asking him

to translate it by the weekend, probably so she can sell it to a friend

in Moscow.

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(U//FOUO) GALKINA was one of the key sources for the “Trump dossier.”

She is directly quoted at points; however, Danchenko is not sure if she

realizes that the questions come from her. Right now, \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. She is keeping \*\*\*\*xxxxx with her

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx\*\*\*\*. GALKINA used to work in the country of

\*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.

### Source 4

(U//FOUO) Alexey 123456 Dundich

(U//FOUO) Dundich1is a xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. He is xxxxxxx

XxxxxXxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. Danchenko met him while he was on an

exchange scholar program at xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx for about x months in 2009-10.

Danchenko spent a lot of time with Dundich during Dundich’s time in

United States.

(U//FOUO) 1234567 specializes in regional politics, particularly

Xxxxxxxxxxxx, but also addresses US-Russian relations, US elections,

and a host of issues involving US-Russian competition and conflict,

including xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxx).

(U//FOUO) 1234567’s everyday job duties as a xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

vary. One day, he could be xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx for a visiting 12345

1234567; the next day, he could be xxxxxxxx a large group of 1234566;

While the next, he could be handling xxxxxxxxxxxx. At 1234, he also

Has contact with friends and associates in the xxxxxxxxxx. As

Danchenko explained, it would not be uncommon for Dundich to remark to

Danchenko things like, “I just heard such-and-such from someone in the

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\*\*\*\* \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,” or “I just

heard this from a Deputy Minister,” or “I just overheard such-and-such

about an issue.”

(U//FOUO) Danchenko and Dundich drink heavily together, and Danchenko

always looks forward to getting together with Dundich when Danchenko is

in town. Danchenko knows that Dundich travels to the U.S.

### Source 1

(U//FOUO) Sergey Vladimirovich Abyshev

(U//FOUO) Danchenko has known Abyshev since late 2001-02, when

Abyshev was part of a xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxx. He has visited both Louisville and Washington DC as part of

exchange visits to the United States. Abyshev is about xx years old and

comes from Nizhniy Novgorod, where he served in city and regional

government positions, including 123456789012345678901234 and Deputy

Mayor. Danchenko explained that things did not work out well for

Abyshev in St. Petersburg, so he moved to Moscow and began working in

the 12345678901234567890123 – particularly with respect to 12345678

1234567890123456789012345678901. From the xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

20xx, Abyshev worked for Russian Ministry of Energy. Over the last few

years, he had served in the capacity of 12345678901234567.

(U//FOUO) Abyshev’s background as a former \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxx means that,

from a young age, he has been involved in political activities. He’s

been in some form of politics since he was a teenager. He is also a

\*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx but

Danchenko could not recall if it was in economics, political science or philosophy. Danchenko has been taking politics with Abyshev since his (Danchenko’s) days as a graduate student at the University of

Louisville. Now, they meet together whenever Danchenko goes to Moscow.

Russian Federation

Federal Antimonoply Service

1234567890123456789012345

Chairman of the City Duma

An Open World program at the Library of Congress

Leningrad Oblast

Nizhniy Novgorod

Russian Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation

deputy director

12345678901234567

Assistant director

123456789012345

Communist cadre

Youth Union

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

graduate of Moscow State Institute of International Relations

former undergraduate at Barnaul State Pedagogical Institute

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(U//FOUO) Orbis knows more about Abyshev because, as a favor to

Abyshev, Danchenko reached out to Orbis to see if Orbis could help get

Abyshev’s oldest daughter a scholarship for language courses in the

United Kingdom. Abyshev asked Danchenko for assistance, and Danchenko

turned to Orbis for help. As part of this, Danchenko explained who

Abyshev was, and why Danchenko was asking Orbis for assistance.

(U//FOUO) Abyshev is always trying to get Danchenko to start projects

and make money together. Danchenko related how Abyshev, like others,

is always asking questions like, “Can you get us some projects?” or

“Can you get us financing?” or “Let’s do something together dealing

with 123456789!” Danchenko doesn’t consider this as his source

“tasking him” but as simply the normal course and scope of networking

In these circles. Danchenko did help Abyshev with an academic book

about xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. He

made about xxxxxx for his assistance with the academic book. For it,

Danchenko went to the Library of Congress, performed archival research,

and also talked to academics he (Danchenko) knew.”

(U//FOUO) Danchenko knows that Abyshev travels to the United States.

### Trubnikov

(U//FOUO) Abyshev has a good relationship with a former director of the

FSB, Vyacheslav Trubnikov. Abyshev considers Trubnikov a good friend,

and he (Abyshev) hears, from Trubnikov, many things about, and from,

Trubnikov’s circles. From Abyshev’s relationship with Trubnikov,

Danchenko has been able to collect information of interest to Orbis,

including Russian domestic politics and more specialized subjects like

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. Danchenko understands that Abyshev’s relationship

with Trubnikov stems from Abyshev’s tenure in St. Petersburg. There,

Abyshev had contacts with the regional Federal Security Service (FSB),

123456789012345678901234567890

Vyacheslav Ivanovich Trubnikov

1234567890123456789012345

FSB, Vyacheslav Trubnikov

123456789012345678901234

A former director of the

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as well as with individuals in the 123456789 who were associated with

politically conservative and strongly Russian 12345678 circles. It was

through these connections that Abyshev was introduced to Trubnikov.

Danchenko was asked if Abyshev was a devout Orthodox believer.

Danchenko did not believe so, but thought that he might have been at

the time.

12345678

Religious

Orthodox

(U//FOUO) Danchenko has never met Trubnikov. He’s never been to one of

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, and said that he doesn’t believe he’s ever

been in the same room as Trubnikov.

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Trubnikov’s public lectures

### Source 5 Details

(U//FOUO) Lyudmila xxxxxxxxx Podobedeva

(U//FOUO) Podobedeva1is an xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. Danchenko has met her in

person, and they are also connected through Galkina. They have been

friends xxxxxxxxxxx for about ten years. They have many mutual Russian

friends. She is tied to Russia’s 123456789012345, and she has ties to

the 123456789012345678901, as well as ties to the Russian intelligence

and security services. Danchenko remarked that things have become

“personal” between Podobedeva and Sechin because of stories that have

been written [ANALYST NOTE: *This may be a reference to the fact that in*

*April 2016, Sechin sued Podobedeva and others for libelx. The Carter*

*Page-Sechin meeting references in the “Trump dossier” would have been*

*derived from Podobedeva].*

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

123456789012345

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

123456789012345678901

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

RBC reporter

### VI. Dossier Report Number 2016/95

(U//FOUO) The interviewers asked Danchenko to review Report 2016/95.

This material was collected during the period where the

## pdf 22:

election-related them was still a “side project.” The election-related

material became a much more important project in the July-August 2016

period.

(U//FOUO) This report involves reporting from “Source E” – reporting

which Danchenko ties, at least in part, to Sergei Millian. Danchenko

related the story about his contact with Millian. In either late June

or July 2016 – xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx - he

reached out to Alexey 1234ovich Bogdanovskiy, a Washington DC based

journalist for RIA Novosti. He asked Bogdanovskiy3some of the same

questions Orbis had tasked him with regarding Trump’s Russian

connections, and Bogdanovskiy put him in contact with another of his

(Bogdanovskiy’s RIA Novosti) colleagues, Dmitriy Zlodorev. Bogdanovskiy

said that Zlodorev had Millian’s contact information, and that Millian

was someone with whom Danchenko should speak. Millian was, according to

Danchenko, someone with whom “they” (RIA Novosti) were talking. There

was even talk about Danchenko meeting up with Zlodorev in person, but

it did not happen.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko reached out to Millian via email twice. He never

received a response from the first attempt, but after the second

attempt, he received in circa late July 2016 a very strange phone call

from a Russian male who he believed to be Millian, but who never

identified himself. The individual on the other end of the call never

identified himself. The two of them talked for a bit, and the two of

them tentatively agreed to meet in person in New York City at the end

of July. At the end of July, Danchenko traveled with his daughter to

New York, but the meeting never took place and no one ever called

Danchenko back. Altogether, he only had a single phone call with an

individual he thought to be Millian. The call was either a cellular

Bogdanovskiy

his daughter

his children

@alexbogd <https://www.facebook.com/alexey.bogdanovsky>[[4]](#footnote-4)

## Pdf 23.

call, or it was a communication through a phone app. Danchenko will

look back at his phone to see if he can get caller information.

## VII. Dossier Report Number 2016/94

(U//FOUO) This report involves the purported Carter Page meeting with

Sechin, as well as the purported Carter Page meeting with Igor

Diveykin. Danchenko indicated that the sourcing for this report derives

from his (Danchenko’s) conversations with Lyudmila Podobedova and Olga

Galkina.

#### Sechin

(U//FOUO) As Danchenko recalls, Carter Page was one of 4-5 names that

Steele provided to Danchenko. Carter Page, as Danchenko relates, had

his meetings in Moscow in early July 2016 – either the 6th through the

th, or the 5th through the 9th. PODOBEDEVA told Danchenko that she had

heard that Carter Page was going to meet with Sechin, and then later,

in writing, PODOBEDEVA confirmed that the Page-Sechin meeting had

actually taken place. Danchenko said that he would confirm the date,

time and circumstances under which PODOBEDEVA confirmed to him

(Danchenko) that the Page-Sechin meeting had taken place. He will check

his phone, but he recalls that he received the confirmation from

PODOBEDEVA via text in September 2016 when he was at 12345678901234567

123456789. Podobedeva was able to confirm that the Page-Sechin meeting

took place through one of her contacts - 1234567890123456890123456789

12345678901234567890. Altogether, Danchenko summarized, Podobedeva told

him about the Sechin-Page meeting, and then later confirmed via text

that the meeting had taken place.

(U//FOUO) Podobedeva travels to the United Statesxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxx.

1234567890123456890123456789 12345678901234567890

an executive handling public relations at Rosneft

a Rosneft executive in public relations department

an executive in Rosneft’s public relations department investor relations

a public relations executive for Rosneft

#### Diveykin

Not discussed in first day

## Pdf 24

### VIII. Media Contact/Outreach to Danchenko

(U//FOUO) Danchenko received two media inquiries on the dossier. One

was from a specialized 12345678901 journal, while the other was from

12345678901234567890123456. He has not responded to either inquiry.

# January 25, 2017

**FBI Washington Field Office Interview Room**

**Present:**

Igor Danchenko, interviewee

Mark E. Schamel, interviewee’s attorney

Stephen M. Somma, FBI Special Agent NYFO

Brian Auten, FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst WFO

Richard Scott, Deputy, National Security Division, US Department of

Justice

### Recent Communication by Christopher Steele

(U//FOUO) Danchenko reported that Christopher Steele had reached out to

him today \*\*\*\*cccccccc. He has not replied, but is planning to do so

either tonight or tomorrow. His plan is to simply say that he has been

meeting with his \*\*\*\*cccccccccccccccc.

## P25

## II. Documents

(U//FOUO) Danchenko brought three documents for the interviewers. The

first was the Russian-language text interaction between Danchenko and

Podobedova regarding the Sechin-Page meeting in July 2016. The second

were copies of 123456789012345 profiles for Ivan Vorontsov, Sergei

Abyshev, Olga Galkina, Lyudmila Podobedova, and Alexey Dundich, with an

added picture of a 12345678901 belonging to Ivan Vorontsov. The third

document was a copied pastiche of a number of profiles, business cards

and pictures, which will be explained in further detail below.

### Document 1 – Podobedova Text

(U//FOUO) Regarding Document #1, the text interaction between

Podobedova and Danchenko, he explained that the date he had given

yesterday was incorrect. The text interchange took place in **October**

versus September, and it would have been during Danchenko’s visit to

**London** immediately following his **October** trip **to Russia**. He was in

the United Kingdom when they had the interaction. Interviewers

indicated that it would be translated, but Danchenko wanted to point

out that the Russian initials [which, transliterated into English would

be I.I.S.] stand for Igor Ivanovich Sechin.

### Document 2 – Friends and Network

(U//FOUO) Regarding Document #2, these are pictures and profiles of the friends and associates in Danchenko’s network discussed the previous

day. Danchenko’s attorney balked at the use of the term “network,”

stating that the preferred term was “social circle.” One of the

interviewers noted that GALKINA’s profile shows her as having studied

at **\*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx**.

(U//FOUO) Regarding Document #3, the following information was

provided:

## Pdf 26

## Document 3

#### 1234567 Head\_678

(U//FOUO) In the upper left hand corner, Danchenko identified

1234567 12345678 as the head of the Russian 1234567890123456789.

He has never met 12345678 and has never had direct interaction

with him, but Ivan Vorontsov and Head\_678 have direct contact.

Vorontsov and Head\_678 are on friendly terms.

#### Deputy Director, 123456789012345678 Department

(U//FOUO) Underneath 12345678’s photo is a business card from

12345 12345678901, noted as Deputy Director, 123456789012345678901

Department. Underneath that business card is what appears to be a

Windows Outlook references to Timur Prokopenko. Prokopenko and

12345678901 work in the same office, and Prokopenko may actually

serve under 1234567890. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Xxxx which Danchenko said stood for 123456789012345678

123456789012. It was from 1234567890 and 12345678901 that

Danchenko heard about the fears and concerns among “[Dmitriy]

**Medvedev**’s people” about what the Kremlin was doing with respect

to involvement in the US presidential election. Danchenko remarked

how the Russian influence issue was considered an “open secret”

and that he was hearing similar stories from other sources –

probably Olga Galkina.

### Banknotes, p 26-27

(U//FOUO) Next to the Windows Outlook screenshot on 12345678901,

there is a list of pricing with the title, translated from Russian

as “collection banknote United States.doc.” Danchenko’s attorney

emphasized that he did not believe this represented anything

illegal of illicit on the part of his client. Danchenko explained

this in reference to Ivan Vorontsov, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

and his interest in xxxxxxxxxxxx. During Danchenko’s travel to the

UK, he went to Edinburgh and, while there, withdrew bank notes from

# Targets:

1234567 12345678 as the head of the Russian 1234567890123456789.

business card from 12345678901234567, noted as Deputy Director,

123456789012345678901 Department, Deputy Director 5+11 – fears and concerns of Medvedev’s

Underneath that business card is what appears to be a

Windows Outlook references to 1234567890123456.

Associate of Deputy Director 4+10 fears and concerns of Medvedev;s

Vorontsov friend 6+7

Official, head of /she 5+10

1234567890123456789

Konstantin Kosachev 0+8

Mikhail Kulagin 7+7

Andriy Bondarev 6+8

Timur Prokopenko 5+10

Tatyana Voronova (7+8)

Olga Sitnikova (4+9)

Igor Diveykin (4+8)

Anton Siluanov (5+8) , minister of finance

Elvira Nebiullina (6+10) , central bank governor

Tatyana Voronova (7+8)

Olga Sitnikova (4+9)

Igor Diveykin (4+8)

Timur Prokopenko (5+10)

Karpova Ivanovna, (7+8) Ministry of Industry and Trade Head of Legal Department Tatyana Demidova, (7+8) Finance Ministry Head of Budget Policy in Government Procurement

123456789012345678901 Department

Government Procurement Department

Domestic Policy Department

Foreign Policy Department

1234567 12345678

<http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons>

<https://web.archive.org/web/20160817133523if_/http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons>

Oleg Smolenkov worked in the Foreign Policy Department of the Presidential Administration.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20160925130421/http://en.kremlin.ru/structure/administration/members>

Deputy Head of the Administrative Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation Pavel Michailovich Fradkov.

http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons

1234567890123456789

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Presidential Administration

123456789012345678901234567

[**Kotyukov,** [Kvashnin,  
Anatoly](http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/29/biography)  
**Mikhail**](http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/553/events)

Kotyukov, Mikhail

[Kvashnin, Anatoly](http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/29/biography)

[Lyubimov,  
Nikolai](http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/506/events)

[Margelov,  
Mikhail](http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/262/events)

Sergey Kiriyenko

Pavel Zenkovich, the head of the administration’s public projects department.

Denis Stepanyuk, an assistant to the Kremlin’s Domestic Policy Department

Maxim Zhavoronkov was named his deputy.

For example, the head of the executive committee became Pskov Senator Andrey Borisov

Oleg Govorun under Surkov, and Oleg Morozov and Tatyana Voronova under Volodin.

The department is now run by Andrey Yarin, who is by no means a member of Kiriyenko’s inner circle. Domestic Policy Department head in 2016

n April 2018, the former head of the Moscow Region’s Serpukhov District, Alexander Shestun, uploaded to YouTube a recording of a conversation with Yarin, FSB Department “K” director Ivan Tkhachev, and Mikhail Kuznetsov, the deputy head of the Moscow Regional government. In the recording, the three officials demand that Shestun leave office, threatening criminal prosecution if he refuses. After Shestun called their bluff, he was in fact charged with felony corruption.

https://meduza.io/en/feature/2019/10/11/russia-s-technocrat-in-chief

**Timur** Valentinovich Prokopenko-Deputy Head of the Internal Policy Department of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation.

1234567890123456

Timur Prokopenko

5+10, above DD and 5+11, DD

4+11, below DD and 6+10, DD

12345678901234567

Maxim Zhavoronkov

123456789012345678901

International Affairs

Domestic Policy

Government Procurement

International Politics

Interregional Relations

Document Processing

Protocol and Organization

123456789012345678901

123456789012345678901

Presidential Clerical

Foreign Affairs

Directorate

Department

Financial Monitoring’

<https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-navalny-wife-tass-pictures-spiked/26941508.html>

Prokopenko, a former TASS correspondent and pro-Kremlin youth leader, was appointed deputy head of the Kremlin's domestic politics department in 2012 under Vyacheslav Volodin, a powerful first deputy chief of staff to President Vladimir Putin.

Last week the collective released [roughly 40,000 text messages apparently taken from the mobile phone of Timur Prokopenko](https://meduza.io/en/news/2015/03/31/data-leaking-group-releases-thousands-of-text-messages-revealing-mechanics-of-kremlin-censorship), manager of the Kremlin’s Internet policy between 2012–2014.

Igor Osadchy,  three different email accounts [allegedly belonging to Dmitri Medvedev](http://top.rbc.ru/society/14/08/2014/942938.shtml), as well as correspondence from Duma deputy and United Russia member Robert Shlegel

1. Medvedev – see report 100 “Speaking in early August 2016, two well-placed and established Kremlin sources outlined the divisions and backlash in Moscow”. Head of Presidential Administration, Sergei IVANOV, was angry at the recent turn of events. He believed the Kremlin “team” involved, led by presidential spokesman Dmitriy PESKOV, had gone too far in interfering in foreign affairs with their “elephant in a china shop black PR”. PESKOV’s position was nothelped by a botched attempt by him also to interfere in the recent failed coup in Turkey from a government relations (GR) perspective (no further details). underlined by a second source, close to premier Dmitriy MEDVEDEV (DAM). S/he said the Russian prime minister and his colleagues wanted to have good relations with the US, regardless of who was in power there, and not least so as to be able to travel there in future, either officially or privately.

12345678901234567

12345 12345678901

Timur Prokopenko

Deputy Director, 123456789012345678 Department

123456789012345

1234 1234567890

\Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Presidential Administration

1234567890123456

12345 1234567890

Tatyana Voronova (7+8)

Olga Sitnikova (4+9)

Igor Diveykin (4+8)

Timur Prokopenko (5+10)

<http://en.kremlin.ru/structure/administration/members>

## 27 pdf

a number of different bank ATMs, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Danchenko brought those notes

to Vorontsov, who would exchange the Scottish bank notes for

rubles – using the current exchange rate. As he remarked the

previous day, Vorontsov is an avid collector and has been doing so

for decades. The pricing list is a “wish list.” [As an aside

Danchenko identified another of Vorontsov’s friends, 123456

1234567, Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

### Russian government employee 12345 1234567890 (Female - Official 1)

(U//FOUO) In the upper right hand corner, Danchenko identified

1234567890123456. She is currently serving as the head of 1234

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, which is run by 1234567890123 or 1234567.

*[ANALYST NOTE: This may be a misidentification. The head of*

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx], who in turn is

connected with 123456789012345. In her position, 1234567890 has

direct access to 123456789012345. Danchenko said that he has not

used 1234567890 as a source for the reports, but that they are

good friends and that he has known her for at least 12345 years.

123456789012345

Andrei Bondarev

**III. Mikhail Kalugin, Andrei Bondarev, Veterans Pensions System, and**

**Dossier Report 2016/111, including Paragraph #5**

### Business card of offical

(U//FOUO) Underneath the picture of 1234567890 is a business card

belonging to Mikhail Kalugin, identified on the card as 123456789012

Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz. Danchenko

has known Kulagin for several years – xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. They were

together xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

12345678901234, during which time Danchenko recalls that he tried to

get conversation with Kalugin started about Ukraine and sanctions.

123456789012345

Mikhail Kalugin (7+7)

Mikhail Kalugin

12345678901234

Washington, DC

## Pdf 28

Danchenko first said that he knows that Kalugin has been back in Russia

since August 2016, but then thought a bit more and said, “maybe summer

2016.” Danchenko described Kalugin as “not a direct source, but he does

appear in the [Trump] dossier.” Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. According to Danchenko,

Kalugin is the only person he (Danchenko) knows 12345678901234.

Danchenko believes that xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx but he isn’t

positive about that. He recalls that they had a conversation later in

spring 2016 during which time Kalugin said that he (Kalugin) had “put

In a word” and wondered if it had helped. They had a 5-10 minute chat [

*ANALYST NOTE: It is unclear if it was the same spring 2016 conversation*

*or a later conversation*] during which time Kalugin confided in

Danchenko that he (Kalugin) was getting tired of doing what he wasn’t

Really supposed to be doing in his job – zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz

Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz – and that he (Kalugin) didn’t want Russia

“exposed” in the US election. It was Danchenko’s understanding that

Kalugin was moving back to Russia and hoped for an xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.

### Embassy Assistant Secretary 6+8

(U//FOUO) As an aside while talking about Mikhail Kalugin, Danchenko

explained that since his time at Brookings, he has maintained distance

from diplomats at the Russian Embassy. He and Clifford Gaddy had

contact with a 123456789 secretary at the Embassy – a strange guy who

was pestering them. They gave this individual open source information.

Danchenko identified this individual as 123456 12345678, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

200x. Danchenko knew 12345678 about xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx while

Danchenko was working at Brookings. 12345678 asked for information

about Ukraine and the Orange Revolution, and Clifford Gaddy recommended

## Pdf29

that they keep him at a distance. Danchenko did talk to 12345678 – he

related to the interviewers that 12345678 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. [*This was how, explained Danchenko, he picked up*

*information about how the xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx*.] 12345678 had

to travel to 123456789012345678901 – sometimes driving and sometimes

flying – to deliver cash 1234567890123. 12345678 completely dropped off

the map sometime around 2007-2008.

(U//FOUO) Looking at Report 2016/111, Danchenko was asked about the

report’s use of the descriptor, “a trusted compatriot.” – as in

paragraph one, “Speaking in confidence to a trusted compatriot in

mid-September 2016…” Danchenko was asked if he was the “trusted

compatriot” in these reports. Danchenko said that it might be him, but

that it could also be others. Danchenko’s attorney then jumped in,

stating that the “literary device” used by Steele in the dossier was

not consistent and not clear, so he wanted to be careful about matching

that descriptor to his client. Danchenko said that, to the best of his

knowledge, he is not sure if he was the only one working on this issue

for Orbis [and therefore he is not clear if he is always the “trusted

compatriot” mentioned in the documents].

(U//FOUO) Interviewers drew Danchenko’s attention to paragraph 5 of the

same report, where Mikhail Kalugin [written as Kulagin] is mentioned.

Danchenko is not clear how this paragraph was put together. Danchenko

indicated that no MFA official told him \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

because of the election issue. About \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxx, Danchenko knows that

\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx\* Danchenko that 12345678

was his replacement – xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. Kalugin had described Bondarev as

<http://search.globescope.com/indexp~2.htm>

DMITRY Y. BABAKHIN

ALEXEY G. TIMOFEEV

ALEXEY Y. ZINOVIEV, first secretary

ANDREY Y. BIRYUKOV

DMITRY N. ADAMENKO

ANATOLY V. KULESHOV

ANDREY N. SHABALIN

SERGEY B. VESELKIN

VALERY I. SCHASTNY

2005

https://books.google.ca/books?id=fnQqcGGPUnMC&pg=PA68&dq=oleg+smolenkov+diplomatic+lists&hl=en&sa=X&redir\_esc=y#v=onepage&q=oleg%20smolenkov%20diplomatic%20lists&f=false

ALEXEY G. TIMOFEEV first

ALEXEY Y. ZINOVIEV, first secretary

Sergey Bababkhin THIRD

DMITRY N. ADAMENKO

ANATOLY V. KULESHOV

SERGEY BELYUTIN

SERGEY MEDVEDEV

VALERY I. SCHASTNY

<https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/cpr/rls/dpl/winter/62955.htm>

ALEXEY G. TIMOFEEV first

ALEXEY Y. ZINOVIEV, first secretary

Sergey Bababkhin THIRD

DMITRY N. ADAMENKO

ANATOLY V. KULESHOV

SERGEY BELYUTIN

SERGEY MEDVEDEV

VALERY I. SCHASTNY

ANDREY N. SHABALIN

<https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/article132761149.html> he former head of the Economic Section at the Embassy of Russia in Washington, has

replaced by Andruy Bondarev

## Pdf 30

“a bright young guy.” Danchenko has no idea where the language in this

paragraph regarding Bondarev being “clean in this regard” (with respect

to knowledge and involvement in US election matters \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxx).

## IV. Dossier Report 2016/94

### Sechin

(U//FOUO) Regarding Paragraphs 1 and 2, interviewers went back over

Danchenko’s explanations from the previous day, particularly the issue

of whether Danchenko had heard from Podobedova that the Page-Sechin

meeting was going to happen, that it had happened, or both. Danchenko

explained that he didn’t recall who had told him that the meeting was

going to happen – it might have been through Podobedova, but the more

he thought, the more he thought it was from someone else, and he

couldn’t recall who. He reported the meeting to Steele in July, and

then, in October, he received Podobedeva’s text with the confirming

information from someone who is a Rosneft executive. Danchenko does not

know the identity of the Rosneft executive.

### Diveykin

(U//FOUO) Regarding Paragraph 3 on Carter Page’s meeting with Igor

Diveykin, Danchenko said that this information came from Olga Galkina.

Danchenko and Galkina had a phone conversation, or maybe Skype, but

Danchenko remembers it was a voice communication which lasted

about 30 minutes. Danchenko said it was during the summer, because he

remembers having the conversation while was at the public swimming pool

123456789012345678901234567 and “whatever” with his daughter. Galkina

was relating information that she was hearing from her sources –

Danchenko did not ask her about the identities of these sources.

Danchenko could probably follow up with Galkina about the sources but

he explained that he has no reason to doubt Galkina. He trusts Galkina

100%.

123456789012

His daughter

12345678901234

of the Rosneft

12345678901234567890123456

who is a Rosneft executive

in Rosneft public relations

in Rosneft’s administration

in Rosneft administration

**Page** also testifies that he met with Andrey Baranov, **Rosneft's** head of investor relations and a senior aide to **Rosneft** CEO Igor Sechin.

## pdf 31

(U//FOUO) On the Divyekin identification, this was the name her sources

gave her. He was in the Domestic Policy section entity and was one of the

people in charge of US-Russia relations [ANALYST NOTE: Danchenko’s

description was someone unclear here, because he added,

“election-related stuff,” but then went back referring to it as

“US-Russia relations.”] Galkina suggested that there was an attempt to

masquerade things or craft a façade because “the folks who were in

domestic policy were working external [foreign] policy, while the folks

doing external were working domestic matters.”

(U//FOUO) Danchenko explained that, on the whole, his conversations

with Galkina were done in an opaque way, so as to be careful

security-wise. Galkina and Danchenko knew that when they talked, they

were talking about the US election issue, but wouldn’t necessarily

refer to it.

(U//FOUO) 1234567 is the one who told Danchenko that the Russian

government was sitting on “kompromat” as stated in paragraph 4.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko’s attorney stated that it was his client’s

assessment that this information from Galkina was credible and

accurate. It is Danchenko’s conclusion that the information in

paragraph 3 came from his conversation with Galkina.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko is “inconclusive” about where exactly the

information in paragraph 4 came from. He thinks he and Galkina may have

spoken about it – Galkina is tied to both 123456 and Ivanov – but he

would not have described Galkina as “an official close to Ivanov.” When

asked by interviewers how he (Danchenko) described Galkina to

## P 32

Christopher Steele, Danchenko said that he described her as “my friend

who knows someone in the Kremlin with direct/indirect access to Sergey

Ivanov.”

## IV Dossier Report 2016/134

(U//FOUO) The information in the first paragraph of this report came

from Danchenko’s text interchange with Podobedova in October 2016.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was less conclusive about the construction of

paragraph 2. The final sentence about the lifting of sanctions was

taken from Podobedova’s text in October, but Podobedova never mentioned

to Danchenko that Page had been offered any brokerage of the 19%

Rosneft stake. There were speculations and “open secrets” about Rosneft

and foreign offerings. For example, **123456789012345678,** an energy

analyst and professor [*ANALYST NOTE: This appears to be identical to*

**123456789012345678,** *who as of* ***\*\*\*\**** *was the 12345678 of Russia’s* **123456**

**1234567890123456789**] suggested in broad terms to Danchenko in **\*\*\*\***

during the **\*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx** that once sanctions were lifted, Rosneft

could find itself in a “privileged” state. As an aside, Danchenko

remarked that 1234567 is often dismissed intrinsically as being a Gazprom lobbyist.

**123456 1234567890123456789**

**Energy Institute of Moscow**

**Gubkin Energy Institute**

**123456789012345678**

**1234567890 1234567**

Viacheslav Morozov

## <http://ceurus.ut.ee/home/people/director-executive-board/411-2/>

<https://www.facebook.com/viacheslav.morozov.14>

# V. Cohen, Prague,and Dossier Reports 135, 136 and 166

(U//FOUO) Danchenko began his explanation of the Prague and Michael

Cohen-related reports by stating that Christopher Steele had given him

4-5 names to research for the election-related tasking. He could only

remember three of the names: Carter Page, Paul Manafort and Michael

Cohen. When he talked to GALKINA in the fall of 2016 – he believes

## P33.

it was a phone call – he rattled off these names and, out of them, he was surprised to hear that GALKINA immediately [later Danchenko softened this to “almost immediately”] recognized Cohen’s name.

(U//FOUO) In Report 2016/135, Danchenko did not know the origins of

paragraph 1. He said that it didn’t come from him, and that he doesn’t

know where the information is from. He described it as “too general.”

(U//FOUO) In paragraph 2 of the same report (2016/135), Danchenko

recognized material from his conversations with GALKINA in the

middle of the paragraph. GALKINA had told Danchenko that Cohen and

three other unidentified people had flown [or, as Danchenko put it

later, “assumed they had flown”] into Prague in August-September 2016

and had met with a group from Russia. Danchenko asked her who else

besides Cohen had come into Prague from the US side – she didn’t know,

but she was willing to go back and find out. She never got back to him

about this. Danchenko also asked about the participants on the Russian

side. She didn’t know, but she indicated that her “best guess” or “her understanding” was that they were from “Legal Affairs” or “Legal

Department.” Danchenko indicated that GALKINA did not say why she

thought that. Danchenko wasn’t aware that such an entity existed – he

was not able to find it through research.

(U//FOUO) Reflecting on the Prague-related material, Danchenko

believes he had 2, maybe even 3, conversations with GALKINA on

this topic later in October. Nothing on Prague and Cohen was

collected during the 1234 trip in August. The first conversation

is the one during which he believes GALKINA noted her recognition

of Cohen’s name. The second conversation is the one in which she

discussed Prague, the visit of Cohen plus three other individuals,

## 34

and the meeting with the Russian side. There may have been a third conversation on the topic, but Danchenko could not recall exactly

and said that they had also talked about “a private subject.”

(U//FOUO) In paragraph 2, Danchenko doesn’t believe he discussed Paul

Manafort with GALKINA. GALKINA didn’t bring up Carter Page or Manafort

during these October conversations. The direct quote “…to sweep it all

under the carpet…” is from GALKINA. GALKINA did not say, however, why Cohen

went to Prague instead of Carter Page.

### Rosstrudnichestvo

(U//FOUO) In Dossier Report 2016/166, Olga Galkina is the one who

provided the Rossotrudnichestvo information and the identification of

Oleg Solodukhin. Danchenko said that during either the second or third

conversation with Galkina about the Cohen matter, Galkina had initially

thought the meetings involved the “legal department” but then

identified Solodukhin and Rossotrudnichestvo. Danchenko kept pushing

Galkina for information about the identities of the US participants,

but she did not know. On the Russian side, Danchenko requested that she

go back to her sources, and it was after that she came back with the

identification of Solodukhin. However, Danchenko said that Galkina never

mentioned or said that Solodukhin was working “under Rossotrudnichestvo

cover,” as is stated in the report. Danchenko had done his own research

and confirmed that Oleg Solodukhin existed.

(U//FOUO) In the same report, OLGA GALKINA is the one who mentioned

“deniable cash payments” and “wires.” Danchenko pushed GALKINA for the

substance of the meeting in Prague, but he is not sure if GALKINA was brainstorming here, or if she is relating information from her sources.

(U//FOUO) As an aside here, Danchenko spoke about some personal

details regarding GALKINA. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. xxx

Oleg Solodukhin

123456789012345

## 35

\*\*\*\* xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.  Danchenko reiterated a

story from the previous day – Galkina had just reached out to him

the other day to ask him to 12345678901 an article about Russian

speakers and Trump. Galkina currently has a visa to come to the

United States. To questions posed by FBI SA Somma and comments

made by his attorney, Danchenko indicated that he could carefully

cultivate Galkina, perhaps even meet her in a third country. To

try and get additional information of interest to the FBI would

require in-person conversation, and Danchenko quipped that he’d

never been an agent. Danchenko said that he had plans to visit

her earlier this year in Cyprus, but that it didn’t work out.

Danchenko said that she knew that he had plans to visit her in

Cyprus, because the two of them had talked through the plans. When

asked if Galkina would be comfortable talking to the FBI,

Danchenko said that he wasn’t sure.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko summarized that, when it comes to the dossier, the

Page material regarding Sechin came from PODOBEDEVA, while the

Cohen/Prague material came from GALKINA.

(U//FOUO) In paragraph 3 of Report 2016/166, Danchenko said that he

believes that the material “strongly corresponds” to a recent, December

2016 conversation that he had with GALKINA. This was a separate,

follow-on conversation to the October conversations mentioned before.

The material is not word-for-word from his conversation with GALKINA,

but partially-based on their December 2016 telephone conversation. For

example, in their conversation, while he doesn’t remember her saying

12345, he does recall her saying 1234567890. He recalls that she talked

## Pdf 36

about Webzilla’s “affiliates” but she did not mention the Democratic

Party in the way that the report says. As he mentioned earlier, he

stated their conversations were held in the overall context of the US

elections and hacking, but he is not sure if she mentioned a specific

political party or candidate at this time. She did mention “porn

traffic” as mentioned in this paragraph. Danchenko does not recall

GALKINA’s reference to a specific time frame of March through September

2016.

(U//FOUO) GALKINA did mention both Webzilla and Seva Kapsugovich, who

she mentioned – as stated in the report – work “under the FSB.” She

mentioned Gubarev and all of his smaller subsidiaries and companies.

Danchenko said that GALKINA **\*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,** which

Danchenko said was one of **Gubarev’s** companies. Danchenko admitted to

the interviewers that his understanding of this topic (i.e. cyber) was

“zero” and that GALKINA is not an IT specialist herself. GALKINA never

said that 1234567890 was involved in any of this. He said that

paragraph 3 has references and keywords involving payments and cover-up

from his conversation with GALKINA.

(U//FOUO) With respect to paragraph 4, OLGA GALKINA gave this as a kind

of example. She didn’t offer any specific information or evidence, but

that this (e.g. Romanian hackers heading to Bulgaria to lay low) is a

kind of example [*ANALYST NOTE: It seemed by Danchenko’s description*

*that this might be GALKINA’s analysis*]. Danchenko is not sure where the

term “bolt hole” is from, and tried, unsuccessfully, to think about

what Russian term this might be representing. When asked if everything

in this paragraph came from GALKINA, Danchenko said that it was

difficult to say with certainty. It sounds like material that GALKINA

would say. Looking back through this paragraph, Danchenko said that

# Pdf 37:

everything before the term “lay low” is definitely from GALKINA, while

he is not sure about everything after that term. Danchenko is not sure

about the specifics in this paragraph and agreed with interviewers that

the report has more specific language (place names; ethnicity of

hackers) than other reports. Interviewers brought up the fact that

Danchenko had mentioned the previous day that GALKINA spoke Bulgarian

and had a family vacation home in Bulgaria. Danchenko did not know if

the family home was in 1234567, but asked if 1234567 was “on the coast”

because that’s where typical family vacation homes were located.

### VI. Source 6, RIA Novosti, and 2016/95

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked to go back over the reports discussed in

brief the previous day regarding his interaction with Sergei Millian.

Danchenko said that Christopher Steele had asked him to find sources

linked to the Trump team, who could answer the overarching questions

regarding Russia’s connections to the team, etc. Danchenko turned to

his contacts at RIA Novosti, and his contacts there told him

(Danchenko) that there was “this guy, Sergei Millian” that he

(Danchenko) should talk to.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko first met in person with Alexey Bogdanovskiy, a RIA,

Novosti reporter in D.C., who is still around (as Danchenko

understands) and who is one of Danchenko’s xxxxxxxxxxxxx. Danchenko

said that Bogdanovskiy has offices in Washington D.C., and the two of

them met over lunch at a Thai restaurant. He didn’t want to ask

Bogdanovskiy very targeted or revealing questions for the election

assignment, so he kept them broad in scope (“Do you (Bogdanovskiy)

know anyone who can talk about all of this Trump/Manafort stuff, or

Trump and Russia?” Bogdanovskiy commented about how there was a great

## Pdf 38

amount of speculation about Russian influence and Russian ties, but

that he was skeptical and nothing substantive had turned up.

Bogdanovskiy said Danchenko should also speak with his RIA Novosti

colleague, Dmitriy Zlodorev. Bogdanovskiy said that “there [is] this

guy Zlodorev interviewed and he (Zlodorev) could probably get his

contact information.” Danchenko said that he believes, in the end,

Bogdanovskiy gave him (Danchenko) Sergei Millian’s email, and that he

(Danchenko) never met with Zlodorev. [*Danchenko added that he will see*

*if he still has the email*]

(U//FOUO) Danchenko emailed Millian in either June or July 2016 – but

it was after Danchenko’s trip to Russia and U.K. Danchenko did not

receive a response from this email, but says that it was at that point

that “things got strange”. In July 2016, he received a telephone call

from an unidentified Russian guy. He thought it was Millian – he still

thinks it was Millian – but the individual never identified himself as

Millian. They talked for about 10 minutes, and then arranged to meet

together up in New York City.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko remembered that they made plans to meet in NYC,

and that Danchenko offered to come up “anytime” Millian was available.

Millian wouldn’t commit to a specific time, but Danchenko said that he

could be [in] NYC “for a couple of days”. Danchenko could not recall if

Millian said the lived in New York City or not, but Danchenko guessed

that he did. Following this, Danchenko – together with his daughter –

traveled to NYC with prepared questions, but Millian was a no-show. The visit would have been near the end of July. Later, Danchenko spoke with

Dmitriy Zlobodev, who mentioned to Danchenko that Millian had been

asking about him (Danchenko). Zlobodev said that Millian had asked him

(Zlobodev) "who the hell you (Danchenko)0were” and that it would be

[**https://www.linkedin.com/in/alexey-bogdanovskiy-95ba1516**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/alexey-bogdanovskiy-95ba1516)

## Pdf 39

hard to reach out to him (Millian) now because he was in 123456789012345

**12345. Danchenko remembers providing Christopher Steele with the**

information about Millian’s whereabouts in 123456789012345678901.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko tried one more follow-up with Millian in September

2016. He decided to use his friend from 123456789012345678, who is

involved in xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. She has a xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

project, so, knowing that Millian xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Denchenko sent

him a brochure about 123456’s project in the hope that it would

generate a response. Millian never responded. At some point, Millian

and Danchenko became LinkedIn associates, but Danchenko could not

remember which of them initiated the LinkedIn invitation.

real estate

123456789012345

Real estate project

(U//FOUO) Altogether, Danchenko and the person he believed – and still

believes – to be Millian had one 10-15 minute conversation. Danchenko

says that “Source E” in Report 2016/95 sounds like it is from this

conversation. During the phone call, he remembers mentioning Manafort

and Page. Danchenko recalls that this 10-15 minute conversation

included a general discussion about Trump and the Kremlin, that there

was "communication" between the parties, and that it was an ongoing

relationship. Danchenko recalls that the individual believed to be

Millian said that there was "exchange of information" between Trump and

the Kremlin, and that there was "nothing bad about it." Millian said


that some of this information exchange could be good for Russia, and

some could be damaging to Trump, but deniable. The individual said that the Kremlin might be of help to get Trump elected, but Danchenko did not recall

any discussion or mention of Wikileaks.

(U/FOUO) Besides the 10-15 minute conversation, Danchenko had no

Further contact with Millian (or the person he believed to be Millian).



Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Early August, 2016

## P40

### VI. Report 2016/80 Trump, the Ritz Carlton and Report 2016/80

(U//FOUO) The interviewers brought Danchenko’s attention to the report

regarding Trump’s alleged unorthodox sexual activity at the Ritz

Carlton Hotel – specifically paragraph 3 of Report 2016/80. Danchenko

said that this information came, partially, from Ivan Vorontsov.

Vorontsov’s circle of associates and friends, Danchenko explained once

more, is primarily in the financial sphere, but his social network is

vast, and he has other, random associates. In fact, as another example,

Vorontsvv travels to xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxx.

(U//FOUO) When Danchenko asked Vorontsov in early June 2016 (the June

trip to Russia) about whether he knew of any compromising materials on

Trump, Vorontsov said that there was a “well known story” about Trump’s

activities in the very hotel xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx –

the Ritz Carlton. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx to make

preparations for the 1234567890123456 event. The “well known story”

involved the allegation that Trump was “into water sports” and had

engaged in that activity “in the presidential suite” at the Ritz

Carlton. In terms of whether the story was true, Vorontsov explained

that people “know” but that it “only becomes fact if people come

forward.” Vorontsov said that the hotel is bugged, and “heaven only

knows” who or what has been filmed by the FSB. Vorontsov said to

Danchenko xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx\*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. Go and check

out the story.” \*\*\*\*

(U//FOUO) As Danchenko explained it, the fact of hotel bugging and the

1234567890123456

Miss Universe

Beauty contest

12345678901234

Trip to Russia

## Pdf 41

use of filmed “kompromat” is not uncommon. Danchenko related the names

of those who have been targeted in this way – [Yuriy] Skuratov,

[Mikhail] Kasyanov, and Vladimir Rushkov [unclear, maybe Ryzhkov].

Danchenko has also been able to comment on hotel bugging because it is

generally known, as he explained to interviewers, that if you want to

visit Moscow and not be vulnerable to being bugged, you have to stay

away from the Ritz Carlton, the Hotel Moskva, and the Hotel Peking.

(U//FOUO) Regarding paragraph 4 in Report 2016/80, \*\*\*\*,

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, he had a

meeting with the managers xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. During a free minute, he

asked about “this stuff about Trump at the hotel.” His interlocutors

laughed it off, stating that “all kinds of things happen at the hotel”

and with celebrities, “one never knows what they’re doing.” Danchenko

said that it wasn’t a denial. And asking the hotel staff who were

assisting with the 1234 arrangements, one girl commented that “anything

goes” at the hotel, and added that, “officially, we don’t have

prostitutes.”

(U//FOUO) For this story, Christopher Steele was given the names of the

management at the Ritz Carlton. Danchenko said that he reported Trump’s

unorthodox sexual activity at the Ritz as “rumor and speculation” and

that he had not been able to confirm the story.

(U//FOUO) In the same report, paragraphs 1, 4 and 5, Danchenko

identified “Source B” as Vyacheslav Trubnikov through Sergei ABYSHEV.

ABYSHEV reported that he and Trubnikov had “had a conversation” about

the content in the report. Trubnikov said that they had “embarrassing

stuff– sexual/pornographic material” on a number of folks, “including

Trump.” Danchenko said that the end of paragraph 4 regarding the

**Horowitz**

For example, the Primary Sub-source told the FBI that, while Report 80 stated that

Trump's alleged sexual activities at the Ritz Carlton hotel in Moscow had been

"confirmed" by a senior, western staff member at the hotel, the Primary Sub-source

explained that he/she reported to Steele that Trump's alleged unorthodox sexual

activity at the Ritz Carlton hotel was "rumor and speculation" and that he/she had

not been able to confirm the story.

WFO Agent 1 said that the Primary Sub-source explained that his/her

information came from "word of mouth and hearsay;" "conversation that [he/she]

had with friends over beers;" and that some of the information, such as allegations

about Trump's sexual activities, were statements he/she heard made in "jest."341

According to WFO Agent 1, the Primary Sub-source told him that he/she spoke with at

least one staff member at the Ritz Carlton hotel in Moscow who said that there were stories

concerning Trump's alleged sexual activities, not that the activities themselves had been confirmed by

the staff member as stated in Report 80.

## 42

ability to blackmail Trump was “logical conclusion” rather than

reporting. The conversation with ABYSHEV took place in June 2016 at xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx – the particular cafe near the

\*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. Danchenko remarked that

TRUBNIKOV insists on having meetings in \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxx himself].

Danchenko said that the mention of the file in paragraph 5 was part of

a conversation between TRUBNIKOV and ABYSHEV, but Danchenko has no idea

where the mention of “Department K of the FSB” is from. He does not

recall hearing that, or mentioning that to Christopher Steele.

Additionally, the years over which the “kompromat” file was collected

were also never mentioned, to Danchenko’s recollection.[[5]](#footnote-5)

# 26 January 2017

# FBI Washington Field Office Interview Room

**Present:**

Igor Danchenko, interviewee

Mark E. Schamel, interviewee’s attorney

Stephen M. Somma, FBI Special Agent NYFO

Brian Auten, FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst WFO

Richard Scott, Deputy, National Security Division, US Department of

Justice

### Recent Communication by Orbis Representative: Overall Wellbeing

## 43

(U//FOUO) Danchenko and his attorney related that Chris Steele had

“signaled” to Danchenko this morning. One of Steele’s associates at

Orbis, 123456789012345 789012 – an analyst who Danchenko said he has

seen approximately 12 times – called Danchenko. Porter remarked that

Danchenko “had been lying too low.” Porter said that “[Orbis] hadn’t

heard from him over the past 10 days, and that they wanted to know what

was going on.” Danchenko told Porter that he’d been staying in a hotel

and at his 1234567890’s place 12345678901234567, and that he had been

talking to an attorney about his xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxx.

[Kieran] Porter

(U//FOUO) Danchenko did not speak with Steele during this conversation.

Danchenko heard from Porter that Steele was still “lying low” but that

“everyone” was concerned about Danchenko’s wellbeing. *[ANALYST NOTE:*

*The attorney commented that the fact that Porter reached out is yet another*

*indication of how his client was put through the recruitment cycle –*

*initially recruited by Chris Steele, but passed off to underlings for*

*day-to-day management.]* Porter and Danchenko discussed some possible

future assignments – “small due diligence assignments unrelated to

politics” – and Porter indicated that they would run stuff by him if

something came up – but [and it was not clear if this was Porter’s

actual comment or Danchenko’s reflection] probably nor much in the area

of Russia. There was talk about wiring past due monies for Danchenko to

Target Labs. Or, Danchenko added, there was also discussion about

getting him money through “someone we know [in the United States]”

Danchenko was hesitant about arranging payments in any way that “looked

strange”.

(U//FOUO) Porter told Danchenko that since the Buzzfeed story hit the

news, Orbis had received 20,000 emails.

UO) \*\*\*\* told Danchenko that since the Buzzfeed story hit the news, Orbis had received 20,000 emails.

## 44:

(U//FOUO) No one from Target Labs has reached out to check on

Danchenko’s welfare. That said, Danchenko typically works from his

home. He works off-hours, given the time difference between D.C.,

Moscow and London. There is space and some desks he can use at Target

Labs, but most of his work is done at home.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko commented that, unless his name goes public, he is

fine when it comes to his source network. He doesn’t believe he can

travel to Russia - he feels that he would be in danger and, as he put

it, \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.

44. Orbis knows, p44

(U//FOUO) Danchenko indicated that Orbis does know the identities of

some of his sources – they have some first and last names. For example,

Orbis knows the identity of Ivan Mikhailovich Vorontsov, who, Danchenko

added, \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko said that he had gone back to check for electronic communication records, but he said that he had deleted most of the

election-related communications “months ago.” He also has a different

phone from the one he used previously. He didn’t delete communication

involving Dmitriy Zlodorev [see previous day’s interview], and he had

reported that communication to Christopher Steele.

## Dossier Report 2016/86

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked a number of questions regarding the

sourcing and information about the FSB cyber-related dossier report.

(U//FOUO) In paragraph 1, the “former senior intelligence officer” is

Vyacheslav Trubnikov, through Sergei Abyshev. Abyshev told this

information directly to Danchenko in Moscow at the 12345678901234567890

## 45

cafe.

(U//FOUO) Some of the material in paragraph 2 was not familiar to

Danchenko. In general, the material tracks with comments made to

Danchenko by Sergei Abyshev, with corroboration via open source

material. Looking more over the paragraph, Danchenko said that the

Trubnikov material begins with the sentence, “To compensate for this shortfall…” Danchenko does not recall using the term “first tier” (in

the first sentence) in his reports to Steele – he is not sure that

information came from him (Danchenko).

(U//FOUO) The material in paragraph 3 could be referencing material

gleaned from one of Danchenko’s xxx friends from Perm, 123456789012345

1234567890. When he was nineteen years old, 1234567890 was caught

“facilitating payments for a pornographic website.” He was offered a

deal – cooperate with the FSB or potentially go to jail. He ended up

doing some work for the FSB, but Danchenko doesn’t know what type of

work 1234567890 did for the FSB [ANALYST NOTE: This is in contradiction

to Danchenko’s statement the first day, at which time he indicated that

he did not have any contacts associated with the Russian intelligence

and security services.] 1234567890 is a couple of years younger than Danchenko, and he (1234567890) returned to “normal life” [that is, post FSB activity] around 123456789012. 1234567890 told Danchenko that he

knew of many other people who have been put in a similar situation

[with the FSB]. Presently, 1234567890 works in 123456; however,

Danchenko is unclear for whom – he (Danchenko) thought that 1234567890 might be working for 1234567890123456789012345, for the banking

industry, and/or doing something in the way of 1234567890123. When

asked if Danchenko would consider 1234567890 a “contractor,” Danchenko said “yes, like myself, but in a different [sector].”

1234567890123456789012345

Renaissance Capital

12345678

Eighteen

Seventeen

Nineteen

Панч джуди

## 46:

(U//FOUO) In the same paragraph – paragraph 3 – the portion that begins with “In one case a US citizen…” was derived from a conversation with Sergei Abyshev. Abyshev related this story, indicating that the US citizen was Abyshev’s friend who does work with “educational apps or something.”

(U//FOUO) For paragraph 4, Danchenko could not attribute it to any

source in particular. The “foreign director of a company,” recalled Danchenko, is a foreign director on the board of 1234567, but he did

not know the exact identity.

(U//FOUO) For paragraph 5, Danchenko said that some of the information came from his discussion with the Russian 12345678901, RUSSIAN CONTACT –

who, Danchenko reiterated, \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [\*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxx.] Danchenko said that “an FSB cyber operative” is an incorrect source characterization and that 123456 had mentioned to him

(Danchenko) that Telegram had been compromised.

(U//FOUO) Regarding paragraph 6, Danchenko could not attribute it conclusively to any particular source. He said that he can’t confirm

it, but he believes the source may have been Ivan Vorontsov. Some of it is open source, however.

# General Summarizing About Danchenko’s Sources

(U//FOUO) The interviewers asked Danchenko if, generally speaking about

the dossier as a whole, the mentions of Dmitriy Peskov [Putin’s press secretary] and Sergey Ivanov can be typically sourced to Olga Galkina. Danchenko said yes – Galkina has direct and indirect contact with a

deputy, or multiple deputies, in 123456789012345. As stated earlier,

123456789012345

The State Duma

The Foreign Min

## 47,

she is also tied into 1234567890123456789012345678901234567. Danchenko

said that, through Galkina, he could try and get the names and the

deputies and assistants she uses for getting her information.

1234567890123456789012345678901234567

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

## Vorontsov friend, primary source on Russian official 123456789012345678

(U//FOUO) When it comes to any material on 123456789012345678,

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx is the primary source.

Vorontsov is friends with xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Danchenkov

related a story from circa 2015-2016. For a different assignment,

Danchenko got Vorontsov to talk to the 1234567890123. During that

Interaction, the 1234567890123 indicated that power and authority when

It came to press relations had centralized on Peskov. Vorontsov’s

friend indicated that “[we’re] all under Peskov now”, which Danchenko

took to mean that authority within the Presidential Administration’s

PR/GR circles had entered a pyramid-type stage with Peskov at the top

of the pyramid.

(U//FOUO) On the material regarding the replacement of Sergei Ivanov

with Anton Vaino, this was also derived from GALKINA, as well as “two other friends: [which Danchenko left vague and didn’t identify]. The

part of the reports connecting Ivanov’s replacement by Vaino to the fallout over Russia’s influence efforts against the US election was, according to Danchenko, his analytical conclusion. GALKINA “confirmed

that it had to be true,” said Danchenko. GALKINA told him something

like “[Ivanov’s dismissal because of US-election related fallout] just

had to be true” or else she said something like “Of course, it has to be that…”

# General Summarizing of Danchenko’s Debriefings by Orbis

(U//FOUO) The interviewers asked Danchenko about how Christopher Steele would go about debriefing him after his visits, specifically about how

1234568901234

Araz Agalarov

Artem Kirilenko

Rustam Inoyatov

Zarakh Iliev

Araz Agalarov

## 48

Steele asked him about distinguishing between what his sources have

told him versus his (Danchenko’s) analytical judgements. Danchenko said that Steele would often ask him, “Are you sure [about what your source

is telling you],” and sometimes would repeatedly press him about a

certain report – emphasizing “Are you (Danchenko) sure? Are you sure?” Danchenko said that he (Danchenko) was very careful about caveating

during debriefs with Steele. He would tell Steele if something was his analytical judgement (“As an analyst, I think…”), explain his confidence levels (“It is possible vs. likely” or “It is plausible”), and even

tell Steele whether something had just not been explicitly denied (“No

one has denied it when I’ve brought it up.”) At times he would tell

Steele that “I’ve told you what I know.” When pressed by Steele to try

to get additional information, Danchenko would explain that he did not want to go back to his friends “3 or 4 times” to try to get additional material – it would look bad and it would raise suspicions. Steele

might ask, for example, “Do any of your (Danchenko’s) sources know if Ivanov was sacked because of the US presidential election?”

(U//FOUO) Not wanting to cause suspicions with friends and associates, Danchenko would try and corroborate the reporting he (Danchenko)

received in other ways. The interviewers also asked if Danchenko would characterize his sources to Steele (“OLGA told me X” or “SERGEI told me Y”). Danchenko said that was not always the case.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko said that his verbal debriefings with Christopher Steele were held at Orbis’ office, not at hotels. Steele would debrief Danchenko solo, and would take handwritten notes of what Danchenko was telling him. Danchenko remarked that it [Steele taking handwritten

notes] was just like “you [the FBI interviewers] are doing today.”

## P49

(U//FOUO) Going back over his note-taking, Danchenko said that he would not really write detailed notes about his source meetings. Even on the Moscow-to-London flight, returning from trips, he might scratch out a

few tentative points – i.e. “5 days, 17 meetings” – and maybe some

cryptic reminders. He might even write a text message to himself, but

he compared it to preparation to a conference panel presentation – a

few notes jotted on a notecard before one heads to the panel. He told

the interviewers that he had destroyed any of these scribbled notes.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked how Steele tasked him – by email, Skype

or phone. Danchenko said it was a combination of these things.

Danchenko described the US election-related tasking came in three

waves: (1) the initial tasking about Paul Manafort; (2) the tasking about any compromising materials on Donald Trump; (3) tasking about Sergey Ivanov’s involvement in the US election; and (4) later on, in the fall of 2016, 4-5 names to ask about [which Danchenko talked about earlier, including Carter Page and Michael Cohen].

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked if Steele had ever mentioned going to the press about with the election-related information. To Danchenko’s

knowledge, Steele never went to the press about this material.

Danchenko never heard Steele voice anything suggesting that this material needed to get into the hands of the press.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked if he was tasked with anything else

similar to what was in the dossier, but does not appear in the dossier.

He said no, and repeated that these types of taskings [on the election matter] made him uncomfortable. Steele pushed Danchenko to try and

either follow-up with people or corroborate the reporting, but

Danchenko wasn’t able to do so. Moreover, Danchenko added, attempts at

## 50

getting corroboration on these subjects made him uncomfortable – he was very nervous about the Russians finding out about it.

(U//FOUO) The interviewers later asked Danchenko to review his

annotated version of the dossier, asking specifically if there were any additional source names that had not been covered in the 3-day interview. Danchenko said that there were no other source names.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko said that he did not have any UK-based friends or social network connections from whom he collects information.

# More Information on Danchenko’s Trips in 2016 to Russia

**(U//FOUO) More Information about Danchenko’s Trips to Russia**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko talked about his 12345 trips 123456789 – 123456789

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx \*\*\*\*. Danchenko also had a trip to

Italy in 123456789 2016.[[6]](#footnote-6)

**(U//FOUO) June 2016**

(U//FOUO) The June 2016 was completely paid by Orbis.

**(U//FOUO) August-September 2016**

(U//FOUO) He remarked that the August trip was “odd”, explaining that,

upon entry, he was interviewed more pointedly than usual. This was the

only time it has happened. For about five minutes, he was peppered with questions and statements like, “What exactly are you planning to do

here? Who are you visiting” Your photo looks different.” Danchenko kept his answers vague – he said he was visiting his \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. All the while, his questioners at entry were checking on the computer. He reported this incident to Steele.

123456789 To Moscow

**1234567890123456**

**August–September**

## 51, saw on trip

(U//FOUO) Going back over the August trip, the interviewers asked if he

made it up to St. Petersburg, particularly since some of the material

in the dossier mentions St. Petersburg. He did travel to St.

Petersburg. He went for a “private weekend” to St. Petersburg that had

Nothing to do with work. He flew 123456789 from St. Petersburg.

Danchenko said that none of the material in the dossier was derived

from his weekend trip to St. Petersburg.

(U//FOUO) The August-September trip was completely paid by Orbis.

**(U//FOUO) October 2016**

(U//FOUO) What alarmed Danchenko most about his 12345678901 2016 visit

was “how perfectly it all went.” Nothing bad happened. There were a

number of events for which he was the facilitator. He had to make sure

people were where they were supposed to be, and he also gave a

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, but it went off

without a hitch.

(U//FOUO) During the October trip, Mikhail Kalugin gave a brief

presentation to the delegation 123456789012394567890123456. Kalugin was

one of 3-4 speakers during a set of talks 12345678901234567890123456

Mikhail Kalugin is the only person during this trip whose name made it

into the dossier; however, the material on Kalugin was not derived from

the October trip. Danchenko did not spend any time with Kalugin during

the October trip. Danchenko said that he saw Alexey Dundich, Ivan

Vorontsov, and 123456789012345678901234567890123.” Danchenko did not

collect anything on the October 2016 trip.

Xxxxxxx 1234567

Energy Forum, Roscongress Fund

12345678901

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

12345678901234567890123456

From YPO to the conference

At the YPO meeting in Moscow

Young Presidents’ Organization

123456789012345678901234567890

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

123456789012345678901234567890123

## 52

(U//FOUO) Steele debriefed Danchenko after the October trip. Nothing

specific was provided; he and Steele just had “ongoing conversations”

about the general situation. Orbis contributed to the costs of the

October trip, but the trip was paid by YPO. It was during this layover

period in London that Danchenko received the text confirming Page’s

visit with Sechin.

**(U//FOUO) November 2016**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko traveled to the UK at the end of November 2016. The

trip was jointly financed by Orbis and Danchenko himself. He met with

Steele, but most of the rest of Orbis staff was on a retreat in Dublin.

He and Steele went out, had a glass of champagne, and had only general

conversations. There was no discussion of the election, and no

discussion of the election-related project.

### 52, St Petersburg and Dossier Report 2016/112

(U//FOUO) Danchenko explained that the overall subject of this report –


Govurun, Alfa Bank – has been a topic he (Danchenko) has been working

for over ten years. It hearkens back to his time at Brookings with

Clifford Gaddy, where they would hypothesize about relationships

between Russian corruption and the Alfa Fellowship.

### Marat Bashirov



(U//FOUO) As an aside, Danchenko told another corruption-related story

wherein Sergey Abyshev told Danchenko that [someone had told him] about

how Marat Bashirov, who had been head of the Lugansk People’s Republic

(LPR) and has been sanctioned by the EU, left the LPR after 5-6 months

to become a top lobbyist for Renova Group – specifically Renova’s arm

dealing with heating and power distribution. Bashirov is a Moscow-based

lobbyist who is working to get the EU sanctions lifted.

12345678901234

St. Petersburg

## 53

### St. Petersburg-Related Information [2016/113] [[7]](#footnote-7)

(U//FOUO) The material regarding St. Petersburg and Trump real estate

deals came from Ivan Vorontsov. Vorontsov suggested that one person to

look at regarding compromising material on Trump was [Aras] Agalarov,

as well as 1234568901234, one of the biggest real estate developers.

#### Talk to Agalarov, 53

(U//FOUO) Danchenko also talked to a friend of his who [*ANALY*

*ST NOTE: either had or knew someone who had*] escorted Trump while

in St. Petersburg. 1234567890123456789012, who he knew as a

teenager in Perm, was a 12345678901234567 who lived in Moscow. She

was about **\*\*** years old when she died, suddenly, last year.

Danchenko heard the bad news from her boyfriend, who sent him a picture

of her gravesite. She wrote stories which were on the critical side

of the Russian government. **\*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx**.

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. He saw her in Russia

during a project circa **\*\*\*\*** 2013 **\*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx**

**xxxxxxxxxxxxx** adding that it was about 6-7 months before the

Olympics. He also saw her **\*\*\*\*56789012** in **\*\*\*\*xxx** 2015 at a

get-together **\*\*\*\*xxx**. He said she was also **\*\*\*\*xxxx**. **\*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxx**.

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

### Reaction of Friends to the Dossier

**(U//FOUO) Reactions of Danchenko’s Friends to the Dossier**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko has had friends reach out to him about Trump and

the dossier. He’s considered it normal joking – \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.

Little Octobrist

## 54

12345678901. He simply jokes back. None of his friends or social

network has broken off contact because of the election or the release

of the dossier.

**(U//FOUO) Friends’ Travel to the United States; Approachability**

(U//FOUO) Olga Galkina

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked if he’d ever met GALKINA in the

United States. Danchenko said that he met GALKINA in the United States

during her visit in April 2016. She had a trip to a number of

destinations in the United States, and she stopped over in Washington,

DC. She, Danchenko, and 123456789012345678901234567890, went shopping

and to a restaurant together. Danchenko said that she came out for her

12345678901234567890. He doesn’t know exactly where she visited

while in the United States, but he thought it was \*\*\*\*xxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko believes that GALKINA had also traveled previously

to the United States – perhaps as many as \*\*\*\*x times. He knows that

she was on a \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxx visiting \*\*\*\*xxx in the mid-2000s. She

has stayed at hotels as well as at Danchenko’s place.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko is not sure if GALKINA would talk to the FBI. He

can’t speak for her. He said that she is in a \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxx right now

[\*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]. Danchenko thinks if GALKINA

received a plausible job offer, she might come over. Danchenko offered

that he would carefully inquire about her plans over the coming year

(2017) and see if there are possibilities – he reiterated that he owes

GALKINA an \*\*\*\*xxx over the next few days about the views of Russian

speakers in the United States towards Trump.

## 55

(U//FOUO) Alexey Dundich

(U//FOUO) Dundich has not been to the United States in probably ten

years.

(U//FOUO) Sergei Abyshev

(U//FOUO) Abyshev traveled to the United States in circa \*\*\*\* - not

long after \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxx. Danchenko met him in the United States.

Danchenko reiterated Abyshev’s ties with Trubnikov.

(U//FOUO) Lyudmila Podobedova

(U//FOUO) Podobedova has occasional travel to Europe and Southeast Asia

\*\*\*\*xx. She would probably be willing to travel to the United States;

however, Danchenko reiterated that she reportedly has “senior

connections” in \*\*\*\*xxx and \*\*\*\*xxx. Off-handedly, Danchenko said that

Podobedova has her own “kurator” [handler] but when interviewers

pressed him on this point, he softened that statement, indicating that

Podobedova “projects an image that she has these types of [secret]

connections and “knows the intelligence lingo.” He never reported to

Steele that Podobedova had a “kurator.”

**(U//FOUO) Danchenko’s Contacts with Russian Intelligence and Security**

**Services (Redux); Danchenko and 123456789012345678**

(U//FOUO) Given his language ability and his overseas travel as an

exchange student, Danchenko was asked if he had ever been approached by

Russian intelligence and/or security services when he was a student in

Perm. Danchenko said no. The only individuals with whom he has contact

who were connected to Russia’s intelligence and security services were

## 

## 56

1. his friend, 12345678901234, who worked for the FSB in order to

stay out of jail 123456789012345, (2) 123456789012345, the 12345678 in

DC who mentioned in the previous interview; and (3) FNU [1234567890],

who interacted with him and Clifford Gaddy in Washington DC. 1234567890

was the head of \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and would pester


Danchenko and Gaddy for information. [ANALYST NOTE: This contradicted

Danchenko’s earlier statements regarding having no contact with

Russia’s intelligence and security services, and it also contradicted

his earlier statements regarding not really knowing if 12345678 was

actually connected to Russia’s intelligence and security services.]



### Interaction with FSB, p56

(U//FOUO) Danchenko also related a story regarding IVAN VORONTSOV’s

interaction with the FSB. Danchenko said that he remembered this story

“right before I talked to you [the FBI] this week.” Circa \*\*\*\*xxxxxxx,

VORONTSOV was \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. VORONTSOV told him

(Danchenko) about this, and also \*\*\*\*xx a picture of the doors at

\*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. At FSBHQ, VORONTSOV was questioned

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx\*\*\*\* he (VORONTSOV) had made about the leadership

of Russia’s \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxx. VORONTSOV was also lightly threatened.

According to Danchenko, he (VORONTSOV) was told that “he (VORONTSOV)

should be more careful; that he (VORONTSOV) should watch his mouth and

act responsibly.” VORONTSOV ended up \*\*\*\*xxx about his interaction,

and received a lot of joking about \*\*\*\*xxxx.

## 57

(U//FOUO) Danchenko brushed aside the idea of being approached by the

intelligence and security services as a student. He explained that it

was the late \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxx, and the university setting was rather lax.

He did not really attend English class all that often because his

language was already good and the classes weren’t that useful. People

smoked in class and dressed down.

**(U//FOUO) Danchenko and Russia’s Diplomatic Corps**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked if he had ever considered a career with

Russia’s diplomatic corps. Danchenko explained that he went to a

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx\*\*\*\* for \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxxx, which he identified as

\*\*\*\*xxxxxx. Most of the graduates were told, \*\*\*\*xxxxxxxxxxx, for

example, that they were slated for big things in life and would be

aimed towards university at MGIMO, Moscow State, or Saint-Petersburg

University, with future careers in diplomacy, interpretation or “going

abroad.” XX years later, Danchenko remarked, probably 1/2 of the students

are abroad, in places like London and elsewhere.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko told the interviewers that he never seriously

considered going into the diplomatic corps. He never tested for it, and

he never applied for any of the major universities listed above [which

would feed into Russia’s diplomatic corps].

123456789012

Moscow State

1234567890123456 1234567890

Saint-Petersburg University

### Additional Danchenko Contacts from Perm

**(U//FOUO) Additional Danchenko Contacts from Perm**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked if – beside GALKINA and others he has

mentioned – if he has used other old friendships, schoolmates, and

known associates from Perm as sources of information. Danchenko balked,

meandered in the conversation, and did not really answer the question.

The interviewers did not press him on this at this point.

## 58 Contacts in the MFA

**(U//FOUO) Danchenko Contacts in Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

**(MFA)**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked about his contacts in the MFA. He

remarked that, over the years, he has collected numerous business cards

of MFA personnel, usually through contact at conferences and events. He

met Yuriy Ushakov a few times at Brookings – and remarked how Ushakov

is known to operate “independent” of Lavrov. Danchenko also met Sergey

Kislyak at a couple of events – he recalled one event that happened on

his xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.

(U//FOUO) After thinking about it a bit more, Danchenko whispered out

loud to himself, “Newmann.” The interviewers asked him for additional

details. Danchenko could not remember the individual’s surname at

first. He said that “Newmann” was from Perm, and that he [Pavel] was a

“strange character” Danchenko met last year. He met Pavel briefly in

Moscow. Pavel’s background was in PR/GR with the xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.


**Pavel** studied 1234567890, and then took a career with the MFA.

Danchenko described 12345’s MFA job as “a delivery boy” but added that

it was strange because 12345 “did not seem to be qualified for the job

that he had [at the MFA].” Eventually, Danchenko recalled that 12345’s

surname was 1234567890123.



(U//FOUO) After thinking about it a bit more, Danchenko whispered out

loud to himself, “Newman!” The interviewers asked him for additional


details.




1. 2010 per Indictment, 15 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Orbis was founded in 2009. https://orbisbi.com/about-orbis [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Indictmnet, 16 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Married to  **[Tanya Demydenko](https://www.facebook.com/tanya.demydenko)** [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Department K of the FSB

   In April 2018, the former head of the Moscow Region’s Serpukhov District, Alexander Shestun, uploaded to YouTube a recording of a conversation with Yarin, FSB Department “K” director Ivan Tkhachev, and Mikhail Kuznetsov, the deputy head of the Moscow Regional government. In the recording, the three officials demand that Shestun leave office, threatening criminal prosecution if he refuses. After Shestun called their bluff, he was in fact charged with felony corruption.

   <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2019/10/11/russia-s-technocrat-in-chief>

   <https://warsawinstitute.org/top-fsb-officials-jailed-oligarchs-struggle/> [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6.  [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. ### 

    [↑](#footnote-ref-7)